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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a "not-too-distant" time when "genetic screening is the norm
and the upper strata of society are closed to people who haven't been cre-
ated through science. In-Valids, they're called . . . ."I Genetic science has
progressed to the point where every human trait can be engineered, and so-
ciety now stigmatizes, discriminates against, and even pities those unfortu-
nate enough to be conceived the old-fashioned way. In this world, those
who are the product of "faith birth[s]" must lie and deceive to gain access to
those areas they desire. 2 Thus, for an "In-Valid" to pursue the dream of be-
coming, say, an astronaut, "he must be genetically perfect, and since true
identity can be established instantly by examination of just one cell, any
cell, from his body, the deception involved in becoming the person he wants
to be is fascinatingly elaborate and difficult."
3
As a chilling corollary, the institutions and organizations that regulate
and order our society-corporations, governments, and law enforcement
agencies-have access to the information contained in individuals' genes
t B.A. and B.S. 1991, University of Pennsylvania; M.B.A. 1998, University of Pennsyl-
vania; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Pennsylvania. Many student authors have ex-
pressed heartfelt appreciation for the efforts of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
editors. To such acknowledgements I would add an apology-my own shortcomings in abil-
ity and effort not only have resulted in any remaining errors, but also undoubtedly have left
many an editor with more work than was wanted, or deserved. I would also like to thank my
parents James and Camille, whose guidance and support through school have been indispen-
sable. I am most grateful, however, to my wife Jody. She has made this, and all else, possi-
ble.
I Shawn Levy, "Gattaca," PORTLAND OREGoNIAN, Dec. 26, 1997, at 19, available in
1997 WL 13148446 (reviewing GA'ITACA (Columbia Tri-Star 1997)).
2 Brian McTavish, "Gattaca" Has Science and Fiction and Soul, KAN. CrrY STAR, Oct.
24, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 3028557 (discussing the need for deception by In-
Valids in order to rise above certain social strata in the movie Gattaca).
3 Rene Downing, "Gattaca" Premise: Future's Not in Stars, but in Our Genes, ARIz.
DAILY STAR, Nov. 20, 1997, at IC, available in 1997 WL 7934923 (reviewing GATrACA
(Columbia Tri-Star 1997)).
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via their medical histories and records. In this vision of the future, corre-
sponding technological advances in information storage, retrieval, and ac-
cess have accompanied the advances in genetic technology. Thus, the fo-
rensic capabilities of the police to investigate crimes such as murder, and
the totality of their access to the private medical and genetic records of citi-
zens, reminds one of the bleak and grotesque futures envisioned by Huxley
and Orwell.4
Of course, many people would recognize the world just described as a
fantasy, created by writer/director Andrew Niccol in his 1997 science-
fiction thriller Gattaca.5 Similarly, few Americans would take seriously the
notion that government authorities collect genetic samples from almost all
of us, keeping and cataloging these samples indefinitely. This, however, is
a reality: hospitals take blood samples from virtually every newborn in the
United States and store a bloodspot on a card.6 These samples, known as
"Guthrie spots," 7 remain stable for many years and can reveal genetic data
indefinitely when properly preserved. In 1994, three-quarters of the states
stored Guthrie-spot cards, and at least four intended to do so indefinitely.
8
Combine this with the push to create a single national health information
database using individual identifiers, 9 and the world Niccol envisions in
4 See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (portraying a fictional future in
which the government pervades and controls individuals' lives); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984
(1949) (describing a fictional world where "Big Brother" and the "Thought Police" represent
extreme forms of governmental intrusion and control).
5 See GATTACA (Columbia Tri-Star 1997) (presenting a world in which genetic engi-
neering is both feasible and necessary to achieve social status, and depicting a genetically im-
perfect person's struggle to achieve his life's goal of space travel in the face of legal and so-
cial barriers); see also Bob Kurson, Dabbling in DNA: "Gattaca" Director Exploring Ethics,
Cul. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at 7-NC, available in 1997 WL 6379554 (discussing the
premise and issues explored in the film).
6 See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA "Banks," 55
AM. J. HUM. GENETICs 196, 196-97 (1994) (describing the possibility of using dried blood
spots on Guthrie cards as a source of DNA for research or testing purposes).
7 Guthrie Spots are named for their inventor, Dr. Robert Guthrie. See Robert S. Boyd,
Nation's DNA Databanks Threaten Privacy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1994, at HI.
8 See McEwen & Reilly, supra note 6, at 196-97 (noting that 37 of the 50 states, plus the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands "retain all the Guthrie cards that
they receive through their newborn-screening programs" and that four states keep their cards
indefinitely, with several other states considering "a permanent-retention policy"); see also
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 468 (1995)
(noting that other "tissue repositories" have been created and maintained especially for genetic
research). In 1994, four states had "saved more than a million cards apiece, and California
alone ha[d] more than six million" stored cards. Boyd, supra note 7, at HI.
9 See, e.g., Arthur Allen, Exposed, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998 (Magazine), at 13 ("The
Clinton administration's aim is to help create a seamless nationwide records system that
eventually may involve a 'universal patient identifier,' the equivalent of a Social Security
number for each patient.").
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Gattaca may be a fantasy only with respect to the genetic engineering. In-
deed, the level of governmental information access and control Niccol de-
scribes is well within our government's vision and grasp.
Not surprisingly, Americans expect and assume that medical records
privacy is a primary and well-defended right in our society. For example,
numerous studies confirm that we consider medical records privacy ex-
tremely important, 10 that we expect vigilance with respect to medical pro-
fessionals protecting this privacy, 11 and that we are concerned that changes
in information technology threaten this privacy.' 2 Undoubtedly, the rapid
and fundamental changes in technology, information systems, and the health
care industry have created an environment in which medical records are
more accessible, and more frequently accessed, than anyone imagined even
Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA" or "the Act"),
the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") is required to create a unique identi-
fication number for every person, provider, health plan, and employer. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-2(a) to (b) (Supp. 111996) (establishing both the standards for enabling the electronic
exchange of health information and the need to adopt standards for the creation of a unique
health identifier). Last summer, however, as the Clinton administration pulled back from its
push for a framework for such a system, it became apparent that such a system of unique pa-
tient identifiers would not be put into use until confidentiality legislation was passed in accor-
dance with HIPAA's provisions. See Frank James, ID-Number Proposals Raise Issue of Pri-
vacy, CH. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1998, § 1, at 6 ("Vice President Al Gore announced the delay [of
HHS's development of the unique patient identifier system] last month during a speech in
which he detailed administration initiatives meant to address Americans' worries about pri-
vacy."). Given the tremendous economic benefits that would result from such a system for
many constituencies in the health care industry, however, it seems likely that this is a delay in
its development, not an end to the initiative. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Health Identifier
for All Americans Runs into Hurdles, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1998, at Al ("Proponents, includ-
ing insurance companies and public health researchers, say the benefits would be vast."). In-
deed, despite Gore's announcement, the government remains actively engaged in promoting a
standard system. See, e.g., Judy Foreman, Your Health History--Up for Grabs?, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 20, 1998, at CI ("In October [1997], the Sequoia Software Corporation in Co-
lumbia, Md., won a multi-million dollar grant from the US Commerce Department to develop
a national 'Master Patient Index.' The goal, the company said, is to develop a 'massively dis-
tributed medical records system across a national computer backbone."').
10 A 1996 CNNITime poll indicates that 87% of Americans want to be asked permission
every time their medical records are accessed for any reason. See Alissa J. Rubin, Gore to
Propose More Privacy Safeguards for Public, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1998, at A26 (citing the
results of the CNN/Time poll).
Il See JOHN M. CARROLL, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SOURCES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE 51 (2d ed. 1991) (reporting the results of a 1990 poll indicating that the respondents
assumed that hospitals would afford them a high degree of confidentiality relative to other
professionals and entities in society).
12 See ALAN F. WESTIN ET AL., Louis HARRIS & Assocs., HEALTH CARE INFORMATION
PRIvACY: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND LEADERS 66-67 (1993) (indicating that 64% of the
public is concerned that computers create an opportunity for unauthorized access to private
medical information).
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ten years ago.13 Because of this evolution, a broad coalition of privacy ad-
vocates, citizens' groups, and legal scholars have called for the federal gov-
ernment to replace the inconsistent and incomplete patchwork of state and
federal laws protecting the medical records privacy rights of citizens with a
single, strong federal law.1
4
The efforts of that coalition came to fruition in the fall of 1997, when,
in response to HIPAA, passed on August 21, 1996,15 HHS issued a report
laying out its recommendations for a federal law. 6 Despite some special-
interest criticisms, 17 many felt that the report, entitled Confidentiality of In-
dividually-Identifiable Health Information ("HHS Report" or "the Re-
port"),18 reflected a legitimate interpretation and representation of the best
aspects of constitutional and judicial protections of medical records privacy
in the computer age.' 9 There was one area, however, where HHS appeared
to shrink from its strong position of privacy protections: the general excep-
tion for law enforcement access to medical records20 was left unmodified
13 Numerous commentators have described this combination of developments. See, e.g.,
Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295,
300-06 (1995) (describing the increasing role of data processing in health care). For a brief
exploration of these changes, see infra Part II.A.
14 See Allen, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining how congressional reform proposals have
been "based on months of consultation with privacy experts, industry and Congress" in order
to obtain "some kind of confidentiality law").
15 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
16 The issuance of this report was highly anticipated and widely covered, with dozens of
newspapers and special-interest information sources reporting it. See, e.g., Insurers Fear a
Strict Federal Privacy Law, INS. REGULATOR, Sept. 22, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File (representing an example of the special-interest coverage of the re-
port's issuance).
17 See, e.g., id. at I (noting that representatives of the workers' compensation and auto
insurance industries warned that the HHS proposals might interfere with claims evaluation);
Medical Records: HHS Proposes Privacy Standards, HEALTHLINE, Sept. 12, 1997, at 3
("Herbert Sacks, president of the American Psychiatric Association, disagreed with the pro-
posals.").
18 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INDIVIDUALLY-IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PURSUANT TO SECTION 264 OF THE
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (last modified Sept.
10, 1997) <http:/www.epic.org/privacy/medical/hhsrecommendations_1997.html> [herein-
after HHS REPORT].
19 See, e.g., HHS Privacy Plan Due this Week, WASH. HEALTH WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 2,
available in 1997 WL 9048137 (noting general approval for the HHS Report's contents by the
American Health Information Management Association, representing a broad cross section of
the health care industry).
20 To describe this exception to the general rule of medical records privacy, I frequently
use the term "law enforcement exception." This term is meant to encompass the related set of
legal principles that allow law enforcement (for example, inter alia, local, municipality, and
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and unregulated, 21 despite compelling reasons for imposition of federal
guidelines in this sphere.
22
This Comment argues for increased federal protections against law en-
forcement intrusion into personal medical records under the set of law en-
forcement exceptions to the general legal principles establishing medical
records privacy. Although it is important to recognize that law enforcement
authorities, like other information users, often have legitimate reasons for
accessing such personal information, there are strong legal and societal ra-
tionales for drafting clear federal-level protections against unwarranted in-
trusions by law enforcement personnel. Profound changes in medical and
information technology have driven our reevaluation of privacy protections
with regard to other non-law-enforcement users of personal medical infor-
mation.23 Similarly, we should reexamine law enforcement access to such
information in light of these dramatic changes.
A critical examination of the proposed law enforcement exception first
requires an understanding of the technological and legal context of the HHS
Report. As a result, Part I of this Comment outlines the changes in medi-
cine and medical record keeping that gave rise to HIPAA and the HHS Re-
port. This Part contains a brief overview of the Act and resulting Report. It
also discusses the manner in which these proposed rules recognize the
changing realities of medical and information technology, and contrasts the
general thrust of the Report with the policy behind the proposed law en-
forcement exception.
Part II then reviews the legal foundations for the current law enforce-
ment exception standard. This Part demonstrates that legal principles exist
that support strong limitations on law enforcement's access to personal
medical records. Part II also surveys the impediments to such limitations
reflected in the constitutional context, federal statutory framework, and
state-level legal structures. The shortcomings and inconsistencies of this
patchwork of legal protections against unwarranted access to medical rec-
state police; federal law enforcement officers; federal agencies charged by statute with en-
forcement of the laws under which they operate) to obtain access to what would otherwise be
considered private individual medical records, protected by the legal standards discussed in
Part II of this Comment.
21 See infra text accompanying note 98 (quoting the HHS Report's recommendation to
leave unchanged the current broad access of law enforcement to medical records).
2. See infra Part Ill (criticizing the HHS Report's failure to address the need for a federal
law governing law enforcement's use of private medical records in its proposed law enforce-
ment exception).
2 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 300-09 (describing the increased use of informa-
tion technology and information collection in health care records and proposing changes in
privacy protections).
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ords by law enforcement personnel, it is argued, cuts in favor of establishing
stronger, more uniform limitations at the federal level.
Part III explores this federal uniformity argument and others. In gen-
eral, Part III develops the major legal and policy arguments for revisiting
the HHS Report's position on law enforcement access to medical records.
These arguments incorporate a review of the moral and social benefits
achieved in creating a clear federal standard. They also recognize a host of
related issues, including the demands of technological change, the need for
greater protection of acknowledged constitutional rights, and the need to re-
evaluate other legal frameworks. Additionally, this Part considers the po-
tential problems in administering the Report's proposed penalties-based ap-
proach.
Part IV offers some suggestions on how the proposed law enforcement
exception could be modified to address the arguments discussed in Part III
while still accommodating law enforcement information needs. This Part
recognizes and evaluates commentators' suggestions for strengthening
HHS's proposed law, and develops a general and straightforward set of rec-
ommendations that, if adopted, would create a legal framework that em-
braces a more vigorous set of privacy protections without undue harm to
law enforcement's ability to achieve its aims. This framework acknowl-
edges the limitations of individuals' privacy rights with respect to their
medical records. In the face of these limits, however, it offers substantially
sufficient protections in the increasingly complex world of medical and in-
formation technology, and law enforcement's increasingly invasive use of
this information.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIETAL CHANGES DRIVING HIPAA
AND THE HHS REPORT
When Congress included medical records privacy language in HIPAA,
it was not only recognizing the sweeping changes that took place in medical
records information management and utilization, but was also attempting to
address the impact that future industry changes would have on individuals'
privacy. This Part provides a limited introduction to the nature and scope of
the changes in health care information technology and records management
and how these changes have been driven by larger influences in health care
delivery. It also introduces the legislation at issue, HIPAA, and the result-
ing HHS Report, discussing the structure and principles that seem to guide
the Report's legislative suggestions, while focusing in particular on the law
enforcement exception.
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A. The Health Care Industry, Technology, and the FallingAway of
Medical Records Privacy
Three factors have driven the evolution in the use of medical records
and health information technology: (1) changes in information technology;
(2) increasing demands for medical research and the need for research data;
and (3) the for-profit shift in health care delivery.24 These changes have
driven unforeseen shifts in the collection, use, and dissemination of personal
data through the health care system. 25 The extent and fundamental nature of
these changes is difficult to overemphasize.
1. The Rise of Information Technology and Its Effect on
Medical Records Privacy
As noted above, the American public is concerned about the potential
loss of privacy that could result from the increasingly complex and ambi-
tious scope of medical record information systems.26 When looking at the
changes in how the health care industry uses technology to collect, manage,
and access data, it appears that the public is justified in its concern. In 1995,
Lawrence Gostin, a noted medical ethicist and legal scholar, observed that
"[p]lans for the systematic collection, storage, use, and dissemination of a
huge volume of uniform data sets in electronic form [were] already under
way and [had] an aura of inevitability., 27 Three years later, a number of
sources confirmed Gostin's assertion that information technology would
transform the use and distribution of medical records in a fundamental
way. 28  Specifically, they observed that these very advances in electronic
24 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 300-06 (discussing the changes in health care and
medical records uses); Allen, supra note 9, at 11-15 (reviewing some of these factors in the
changes in health care).
See, e.g., Doug Stanley & Craig S. Palosky, Electronic Storage Opens New Chances
for Abuse, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 17, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 7035400 [hereinafter
Stanley & Palosky, Electronic Storage] (arguing that changes in information technology can
improve health care, but also threaten privacy because of information dissemination); Doug
Stanley & Craig S. Palosky, Privacy Lost, TAMPA TREB., Feb. 16, 1997, at 1, available in
1997 WL 7035275 [hereinafter Stanley & Palosky, Privacy Lost] (describing an employer's
use of an employee's private medical records in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995)).
26 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (indicating that over 60% of the public be-
lieved that computer systems created unauthorized access problems in the area of confidential
medical records).
27 Gostin, supra note 8, at 452.
28 There is ample statistical and anecdotal evidence of this revolution. For example, Ar-
thur Allen notes that:
Health care providers are currently spending around $2 billion a year to build new
information networks that support approaches such as "disease management," which
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information systems create the opportunities for improper access.29  In
March 1997, the National Research Council30 released a report decrying the
lack of security of electronic medical records and warning that the increas-
ing use of computer systems to gather, hold, and manipulate personal health
information was creating a serious threat to privacy rights of patients.
3 1
Undoubtedly, changes in information systems technology could create a
need for new legal protections of privacy that work within the shifting con-
text wrought by these changes.
32
2. The Escalating Needs of Medical Researchers
Also driving the need for improvements in privacy protections for
medical data are the changes in medical research and research data collec-
tion. Innovations in information systems technology have improved re-
searchers' ability to collect, store, and interpret increasingly larger sets of
consists in part of computerized programs that help prod sick people into getting
particular kinds of treatment. At Harvard Pilgrim Health Care in Boston, for exam-
ple, information specialists scanned the company database and located all patients
who had had expensive emergency room visits more than three times. Many of
them, it turned out, were alcoholics. Thereafter, when one of the patients entered an
emergency room, his or her primary physician was notified and instructed to talk to
the patient.
Allen, supra note 9, at 15; see Craig S. Palosky & Doug Stanley, Computer Full of Secrets,
TAMPA TRIn., Feb. 18, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 7035604 (reporting on Florida health
officials' development of a statewide information database that began requiring Social Secu-
rity numbers in 1995); Stanley & Palosky, Privacy Lost, supra note 25, at I (describing the
employer's health care information collection and use at issue in Doe, 72 F.3d at 1135-37).
29 See Jean Hellwege, Security Problems Plague Financial, Medical Record Keepers,
TRIAL, June 1997, at 22 ("Tlhe online storage and transmission of these records have made it
easier for computer-savvy snoops to access them.").
30 The National Research Council is "a part of the National Academy of Sciences, a pri-
vate organization chartered by Congress to conduct research at the request of government
agencies." Paul Recer, Radon Linked to 21,800 Deaths, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs, Feb. 20,
1998, at E12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
31 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC
HEALTH INFORMATION 3 (1997) ("Within individual organizations, electronic information
systems and [electronic medical records] are potentially vulnerable to misuse from both
authorized users and unauthorized outsiders who inappropriately access patient information
for their personal or economic gain.").
32 See, e.g., Frangoise Gilbert, Privacy of Medical Records? The Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 Creates a Framework for the Establishment of Security
Standards and the Protection of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 73 N.D. L. REV.
93, 93-95 (1997) (discussing technological changes in medicine and the resulting need for
federal legislation); Gostin, supra note 8, at 516-17 (advocating that changes in technology
mandate the need for federal laws in this area); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 300-38 (arguing
that changes in data collection and usage require a reevaluation of general privacy law); Allen,
supra note 9, at 13-14 (observing generally the trend toward legislative changes that have re-
sulted or will result from these technology advances in medical records management and use).
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data. For example, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
exemplifies a relatively recent effort to create a comprehensive medical re-
search database.33 This database contains broad health status data in pa-
tient-identifiable34 form on 40,000 individuals.35 The subjects are exam-
ined, and hundreds of data elements are collected from each person.36 There
is no doubt that such ambitious accumulations of medical data would not be
possible without modem database technology, in large part because access
to such data is made easier by the electronic format in which it is stored.
Commentators have recognized the growing relationship between the in-
creasing research interest in health information databases and the increasing
computerization of such information. William Lowrance, in his report to
HHS on research and privacy, noted that "[a]s databases are maturing and
increasing in size and quality, their appeal as research resources also is
growing. Thus the databases of healthcare finance systems and managed-
care organizations, among others, are much in demand. These large collec-
tions of standardized, computerized data have much information to yield. 37
Certainly, the evolution of private health information management has
33 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., PLAN AND OPERATION OF THE THIRD NATIONAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION
ExAMINATION SURVEY, 1988-1994, at vi (1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS] (describing the survey as a "mammoth national study").
34 "Patient-identifiable" is a term of art used in the health care information technology
industry to describe medical record data that can be used to trace the information back to an
identifiable, individual patient. Interview with Mark Davidson, Health Care Information
Technology Consultant, First Consulting Group, Inc., in Phila., Pa. (Oct. 4, 1997).
35 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 33, at 1 (noting that the
goals of the survey "included the need for precise descriptive information on the health status
of selected population groups of the United States and required that these groups be sampled
in large proportions to ensure the precision of the information").
36 See id. at 48-62 (liting the dozens of blood and urinary data assessments, almost 100
assays and related analyses, the 20 general exam types, the areas of nutrition-related data col-
lected, other findings reported, and the over 100 lab tests reporting categories used during the
stud5. WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH: A REPORT TO THE U.S.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 62 (1997). Also, much research is done on
data collected for other non-research purposes. For instance, extensive research efforts are
based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration's Medicare and Medi-
caid databases; these repositories contain perhaps the largest collection of health data in the
world. See id. at 18-19 ("Perhaps the largest collection of health databases in the world is
the... U.S. 'Medicare' database systems . . . ."). Note that such research efforts do not nec-
essarily contribute to the growth of health information's electronic collection and storage. Yet
such secondary uses certainly multiply the number of users of private health information, and
research demands can often affect govenmental collection and treatment of private health-
related data even when the primary goal of collection is to further non-research aims. See id.
at 19 (noting that the Health Care Financing Administration creates "[p]ublic-use" files of
confidential medical data for research purposes when the data in its original form was for
"administrative and billing" records).
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driven the desire for researchers to collect data and use existing private data
collections in previously unintended ways.
3. Health Care Industry Changes
The most important factor driving the need for changes in medical rec-
ord privacy laws is the fundamental change in the delivery and financing of
health care. These changes are characterized by an increasing demand by
payors (employers, individuals, and the government) to drive costs down-
ward, and the resulting shift to a for-profit focus in medical service provi-
sion, as formerly non-profit institutions are replaced by publicly-traded
companies.38 These economic forces have resulted in a dramatic shift in
how health care is delivered to insured patients. Nine years ago, fewer than
twenty-five percent of insured Americans received health care in a man-
aged-care environment; as of 1998, over eighty-five percent of those insured
in this country obtain care through a service delivery system that contains at
least "significant" forms of cost management.
39
This transformation results in services where costs are sharply in focus,
and those providing services seek to reduce costs in increasingly sophisti-
cated ways. One consequence of this is that providers use information
systems not only to collect and manage insurance payments and to verify
service provisions, but also to help change medical practice in an effort to
reduce costs or improve profits.41 Hospitals, nursing homes, and physician
38 Interview with Howard Capek, Medical Services Research Analyst, Credit Suisse First
Boston, in N.Y., N.Y. (Dec. 19, 1997) (discussing generally the increasing profit motive in
health care services provision, and the rise of for-profit hospital chains in particular).
39 Linda Burns, Vice President, Columbia/HCA Inc., Health Care Finance Class Lecture
at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 23, 1998) (lecturing
on the transformation of the health care services industry that resulted from this change in
payor mix).
40 Interview with Howard Capek, supra note 38 (discussing utilization review, cost man-
agement via preventative care, and other information technology efforts undertaken by health
care providers in an effort to reduce costs through improved information management and
analysis).
41 See id. (discussing Genesis/Eldercare, a long-term care company, and its implementa-
tion of information systems to track pertinent data in an effort to create standardization of care
that will drive down costs); see also Allen, supra note 9, at 15 (discussing the controversial
use of data mining techniques to identify patients with alcoholism). Another example of how
the increasingly extensive use of private medical data is driven by economic concerns is in the
pharmacy benefit management ("PBM") industry. Here, companies compile a vast amount of
prescription-related information on patients, then analyze it to promote more effective pre-
scription practices by physicians, increased compliance with the drugs' instructions by pa-
tients, and use of cheaper drugs by doctors and pharmacists. As a testament to the economic
importance of this use of medical records, pharmacy retailer, Rite Aid Corporation, recently
acquired Eli Lilly's PBM subsidiary for $1.6 billion, thereby acquiring access to information
on 300 million prescriptions annually. See Rite Aid to Acquire Lilly's PCS Health Systems;
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practice management companies routinely employ staffs of "utilization re-
view experts, ' A2 and implement complex information management systems
to monitor patient care delivery by collecting private patient data.4 3 The
collection of private medical data to further these industry-wide cost con-
tainment goals is such a large phenomenon that an entire industry has de-
veloped to meet the information collection and management needs of pro-
viders. According to a research analyst who focuses on health care services,
"[t]he health care MIS [(management information systems)] industry has
gone from an in-house function at the insurance company to a rapidly
growing force with a few dozen players and a few billion [dollars] in reve-
nue."A
4
Because of these changes in the health care industry, private medical in-
formation users have become too numerous to catalog. The Institute of
Medicine, a leading association of medical professionals, 45 found that the
complete list of groups, individuals, and other corporate, research, or gov-
ernment entities authorized to use patient records would encompass all enti-
ties affiliated with the health care industry in our country.46 Furthermore,
the installation of database technology to facilitate use of patient informa-
tion often disregards privacy laws and restrictions; laws are so complex and
Pharmacy Benefits Management Subsidiary, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 17, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File ("The combination brings together two leading companies en-
gaged in enhancing the quality of pharmacy care and in the management and containment of
health care costs ..... ').
42 Interview with Howard Capek, supra note 38 (discussing utilization review and ex-
plaining that utilization review experts study patient data obtained during the provision of care
in an effort to develop cost-saving practice standards and identify over-provision of care by
the provider's doctors). "Utilization review" and "utilization management" are terms that en-
compass the broad range of efforts by health care providers and payors to reduce costs by
analyzing practice patterns of doctors, and standardizing these practices. See, e.g., Thomas
Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, The Reconfiguration of US Medicine, 274 JAMA 85, 86-87
(1995) (discussing insurers' use of utilization review controls and the rise of health mainte-
nance organizations focused on containing costs through some form of utilization manage-
ment).
43 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 15 (noting that $2 billion is currently spent each year
by companies to build medical record information systems).
Interview with Michael Wiggins, Health Care Investment Banking Associate, Credit
Suisse First Boston, in Phila., Pa. (Jan. 28, 1998) (noting the rapid development and growth of
the health care management information systems industry).
45 See Michael Fumento, The Squeaky Wheel Syndrome, AM. SPECTATOR, Dec. 1998, at
1, 6 (describing "the Institute of Medicine [as] a branch of the highly reputed, non-
governmental National Academy of Sciences").
46 See COMMiTTEE ON IMPROVING THE PATIENT RECORD, INST. OF MED., THE
COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN EssENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE 75
(Richard S. Dick et al. eds., rev. ed. 1997) ("An exhaustive list of patient record users would
essentially parallel a list of the individuals and organizations associated directly or indirectly
with the provision of health care.").
1019
1020 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 147:1009
varied that companies often implement information systems without careful
consideration of privacy law.47 The scale and scope of the information
management changes in health care, when coupled with the disparity in the
coverage and strength of laws governing the use of private medical rec-
ords, 48 has contributed to the urgent need for a strong, uniform set of guide-
lines covering the use of patient information.
B. HIPAA and the HHS Report
These and other factors gave rise to a number of federal legislative ini-
tiatives that have sought to address the need for such privacy protections.
Eventually, Congress passed HIPAA,49 which sets forth a procedure for the
development of such regulations or laws. A discussion of the Act's passage
and its content is below, as well as an examination of the resulting HHS Re-
port.50 Finally, an introduction and description of the Report's law en-
forcement exception follows.
1. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
In the face of rapid and profound changes in health information tech-
nology and its usage by health care participants, compelling arguments exist
for general, federal-level confidentiality protections.5 1 Consequently, law-
makers recognized a need for federal legislative action, and there has been
47 Interview with Mark Davidson, supra note 34 (explaining the overwhelming lack of
understanding about privacy law by health care information technology professionals in gen-
eral). From a purely doctrinal perspective, the laws may not be terribly complex, but there
does exist a daunting amount of legal infrastructure for national medical information users.
For instance, the medical information practitioner's Patient Confidentiality reference lists
state confidentiality and reporting statutes that apply in abortion, AIDS/HIV, and child abuse
cases. The applicable laws are rarely found in the same code sections across these three illus-
trative scenarios, and specific confidentiality rules for each state are often found in yet another
area of its statutory framework. See JANET MCGEE SAUNDERS, PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
56-64 (1996).
48 See infra Part II (providing an overview of the scope of law enforcement access to
medical records).
49 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
50 HIPAA mandated that HHS draft proposed privacy rules and report to Congress on its
proposal. See id. § 264(a), 110 Stat. at 2033 (setting forth the role of HHS in this process).
For example, it has been noted that the current patchwork of protections results in
"rights [that] have not been uniformly enforced," despite the ability of national insurers to
amass, access, and use large amounts of confidential information. Denise M. Nagel, M.D.,
Director, National Coalition for Patient Rights, Address to the National Committee on Vital
and Health Statistics (Feb. 19, 1997) (visited Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.tiac.net/userslgls/
mynameis.htm>.
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significant legislative activity in the area of medical records privacy over
the past several years.52
Although recent attempts to pass legislation in Congress have failed,53
the enactment of HIPAA put into motion the beginnings of a complete fed-
eral legal structure addressing health information privacy. 4 In particular,
HIPAA contains some language, albeit limited, that addresses specifically
the lack of privacy protections regarding health information.55 Prior to this,
legislators considered it constitutionally appropriate for individual state laws
to govern medical records privacy,56 and consequently a patchwork of state
laws currently offers citizens widely disparate levels of protections. 57 Since
no concerted effort created this current framework, no uniformity exists
among the states' laws.
58
52 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 32, at 94-95 (listing recent congressional legislative ini-
tiatives). "There have been many attempts in the past several years to enact federal legislation
that addresses the protections of health information privacy." Id.; see also LOWRANCE, supra
note 37, at 60-61 (mentioning briefly the "[s]everal Federal bills governing medical pri-
vacy... [that] have been proposed in the past few years"). For a comprehensive overview of
the legislative activity prior to HIPAA, see Bartley L. Barefoot, Comment, Enacting a Health
Information Confidentiality Law: Can Congress Beat the Deadline?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 283,
310-14 (1998).
53 See Gilbert, supra note 32, at 94 (noting that all five medical records privacy bills in-
troduced in the 104th Congress failed to be enacted); Barefoot, supra note 52, at 310 ("De-
spite widespread agreement with the fair information principles [espoused in a 1973 federal
report on confidentiality], repeated attempts to enact a federal health confidentiality law have
been unsuccessful.").
54 See Allen, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting that HIPAA represents a first step toward a
com1,lete legal structure).See HIPAA § 262, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring security standards or
safeguards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of health information and to protect
against unauthorized uses). Note, however, that this language is limited in scope and purpose.
See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of privacy protection that
is provided indirectly by HIPAA).
56 For example, in discussing the States' authority to make laws regarding health infor-
mation privacy, Frangoise Gilbert plainly notes that in the past, "[t]hese matters were consid-
ered to be local in nature. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution clearly
grants each state the power to legislate health care issues, including the protection of medical
records privacy." Gilbert, supra note 32, at 93.
57 See infra text accompanying note 95 (noting that the HHS Report declares that current
state protections are inadequate).
5 Montana and Washington are the only two states thus far to enact the 1985 Uniform
Health Care Information Act, despite the fact that it is a model act. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-16-501 to 50-16-553 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.02.005-70.02.904 (West 1992
& Supp. 1993).
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Interestingly, HIPAA does not list among its purposes the establishment
of strong privacy safeguards. 59 Instead, the intention of the Act is to im-
prove health insurance coverage portability and renewability, and make
changes to medical savings accounts and other tax-related health care pay-
ment issues. 60  Title II of the Act, where the HHS mandate resides, ad-
dresses fraud prevention and requires simplification of health claim admini-
stration. 61 In particular, Subtitle F of Title II deals with administrative
simplification; its goal is to improve the administration of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs and "the efficiency and effectiveness of the heath care
system, by encouraging the development of a health information system
through the establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic
transmission of certain health information. 62  Most importantly, section
262 of HIPAA focuses on the enactment of standards for the secure trans-
mission of health information data.63 Some legal commentators view this
section of the law as currently representing the best foundation for appropri-
ate and substantial health information privacy protection at the federal
level.64
HIPAA, and in particular section 262, does not provide direct protection
of individual health information privacy. Rather, the law establishes a
framework and series of deadlines for the creation of more specific laws or
regulations. First, HIPAA establishes the scope of data standards, the defi-
nition of those standards, and to whom and to which transactions the stan-
dards will apply.65 With respect to these standards, section 262 requires the
adoption of "safeguards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the in-
formation and protect against threats to security or integrity of the informa-
tion and unauthorized uses of the information."66 Instead of providing fur-
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 242k (1994 & Supp. H 1996) (identifying the purpose of the Act as
improvement of the Medicare program, the Medicaid program, and the "efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the health care system"); see also id. § 1320d to d-8 (Supp. 111996); id. § 1395cc
(1994 & Supp. H 1996).
60 See id. § 1320d to d-8 (amending ERISA and the Public Health Service Act with re-
spect to availability, portability, and renewability of health insurance coverage).
61 See id. (creating standards for communications, as well as fraud and abuse prevention).
62 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 261, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (1996).
63 Id. § 262 (establishing universal participant identifiers and authentication standards).
6 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 32, at 95 ("To date, [section] 262 appears to be the piece
of legislation that is the most able to provide some guidance and relief in framing an adequate
protection for health care information.").
65 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d (defining "code set," "health care clearinghouse," "health
care provider," "health information," and "health plan" for purposes of the Act). These types
of standards are intended to create more uniformity among medical data, facilitating transmis-
sion of data from one user to another throughout the health care delivery system.
6 Id. § 1320d-2(d).
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ther specificity, section 262 requires the HHS Secretary to adopt security
standards that consider current technical information system capabilities, the
cost of security measures, the need for training those with access to health
information, the value of audit trails in computerized record systems, and
the needs and capabilities of small or rural health care providers.
6 7
Finally, the Act states that within twelve months of its enactment, the
HHS Secretary must submit "detailed recommendations" to Congress "on
standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health in-
,,68formation. Moreover, if Congress fails to enact legislation governing
standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health in-
formation within thirty-six months after the passage of HIPAA, the HHS
Secretary must promulgate final regulations containing such standards no
later than forty-two months after the passage of HIPAA.69  Thus, in the
event Congress fails to pass a health information privacy law by August
1999, HIPAA mandates that HHS must establish federal regulations, with
the original HHS Report serving as the foundation for such regulations. °
HIPAA is the first crucial step toward federal health records privacy,
yet it is a hesitant one.71 The Act's primary focus is on health information
standardization, not privacy, and it does not create immediate safeguards
72against unwarranted intrusions. Legal commentators consider parts of the
67 See id. § 1320d-2(a)(1) (requiring the HHS Secretary to consider various factors when
establishing standards for electronic exchange of health information and standard unique
health identifiers).
68 HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033.
69 See id.; see also Allen, supra note 9, at 13 (outlining HIPAA's deadlines for regulatory
and legislative action).
70 See HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033. There seems to be ample political impetus for
congressional resolution of HIPAA's requirements, see, e.g., Lee Bowman, Congress to Try
Again for New Medical-Records Privacy Law, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 26, 1998, at A6 (noting
Congress's desire to craft a legislative solution and its antipathy toward the HHS Report's
proposals), and legislators have put forth multiple proposals, see Barefoot, supra note 52, at
319-21 & n.258 (describing in detail the legislative initiatives pertaining to the HIPAA dead-
line for a new privacy law). Privacy commentators, however, are not sanguine about Con-
gress's prospects for achieving a legislative solution. See, e.g., id at 284 ("If the past serves
as any indication, disagreements on several key issues may cause the deadline to pass without
congressional action.").
One commentator characterized the inclusion of privacy protections within HIPAA as
follows: "One goal of that legislation [(HIPAA)] was to speed the computerization of health
care records, and privacy advocates inserted language to ensure that computerization was ac-
companied by better protection." Allen, supra note 9, at 13.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that HIPAA does not list among its
purposes the establishment of strong privacy safeguards).
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Act, however, to be a positive first step toward stronger safeguards.73 To
this end, its call for an HHS proposal of rules is the most concrete initiative
Congress has undertaken, and the resulting HHS Report addresses many of
the privacy concerns that arise in a modem, information-age health care de-
livery system.
2. The HHS Report
The resulting HHS Report, entitled Confidentiality of Individually-
Identifiable Health Information, is presented in three major sections.74 It
begins with an introduction, which includes a listing and elucidation of the
principles behind the Report's recommendations.7 5  Next, a recommenda-
tions section provides guidance on the scope of, requirements for, and ex-
ceptions to the general protections discussed.76  Lastly, a concluding re-
marks section briefly reviews the main thrust of the Report.77  Not
surprisingly, various interest groups expressed dissatisfaction with certain
details in the Report, but on the whole, many privacy advocates and health
care delivery industry representatives felt that the Report was balanced and
fair, despite these perceived flaws.78 A brief overview of the Report fol-
lows.
The Report begins by underscoring the need for federal legislation and
acknowledging that current state and federal protections are inadequate, es-
pecially in light of the rapid technological changes sweeping through health
care data use.79 It then discusses five principles which serve as a framework
for the remainder of the Report: (1) appropriate boundaries that prevent in-
formation flow for non-health reasons, such as firing an employee; (2) secu-
73 See Allen, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that, as a result of I-PAA, Congress will proba-
bly pass a federal privacy law aimed at "limiting the authorized uses of medical information
and ,roviding for legal redress in the event of abuse").
74 See HHS REPORT, supra note 18.
75 See id. pt. I.
76 See id. pt. II.
77 See id. pt. III.
78 See, e.g., HHS Privacy Plan Due This Week, supra note 19, at 1, (citing approval from
the Health Information Management Association, for example). Note, however, that one rea-
son the Report may not have drawn so much criticism is that some observers felt the Report
was too general to be controversial. They argued that the Clinton administration abdicated its
responsibility to develop a detailed draft law governing medical records privacy. See, e.g.,
Jerry Geisel, Administration Leaves Rules on Record Privacy to Congress, BUS. INS., Sept.
22, 1997, at 2 (arguing that the Clinton Administration privacy guidelines are "general" and
"vague" and noting that the "Clinton Administration will leave it to Congress to develop new
rulesgoveming the privacy of medical records").
V-See H-S REPORT, supra note 18, pt. I.B (arguing that "[tihe existing legal structure
does not effectively control information about individuals' health").
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rity to prevent insurers and marketers from abusing the data; (3) consumer
controls to allow people to check their records for mistakes and to find out
who else has looked at them; (4) accountability so records abusers are pun-
ished; and (5) public responsibility, allowing adequate access to the research
and teaching communities.80 The first four of these principles undergird the
Report's recommendations, which protect individuals' private health infor-
mation. For example, the impetus driving the first principle, the recognition
of appropriate boundaries, is described by HHS Secretary Donna Shalala as
follows:
[Drawing appropriate boundaries] means hospitals can use this information to
provide and pay for quality care for their patients. And, subject to the re-
quirements of other laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
employers could use it to provide on-site care for their employees or to ad-
minister a self-insurance plan. But, those same employers should not be able
to use information obtained for health care purposes to make decisions about
job hiring and firing, placements and promotions. We are recommending
strong protections for Americans from the inappropriate disclosure of their
medical records.
81
Hence, the Report draws a strict line between proper and improper uses
of health data, using a "for health-related purposes" only rule. Applying
this guiding principle, specific proposals result concerning those covered by
the recommendations, the information uses permitted, and the types of in-
formation covered. 2 Similarly, recommendations also logically follow
from the next three principles: standards for security measures are the result
of the security principle;83 rights of individuals to review their own health
data come from the notion that consumer controls should be in place;84 and
suggested penalties arise from the concept that abusers of private health data
should be punished.85
The fifth principle, the so-called "public responsibility" principle,
stands in stark contrast to the other foundations of the Report (and their con-
sequent recommendations). In essence, this notion of public responsibility
80 See id. pt. .E-I.I.
81 Protecting Our Personal Health Information: Privacy in the Electronic Age: Hear-
ings of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 21 (1997) (statement
of Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services) [hereinafter Hearings Statement].
82 See HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. II.A (describing suggestions for coverage of a
federal health privacy statute).
83 See id. pt. II.B(2) (recommending "appropriate levels and types of protective meas-
ures See id. pt. II.C(2) ("The ability to see one's own record is central to effective control of
information and is a basic fair information practice.").
85 See id. pt. II.H (describing civil and criminal penalties to aid enforcement of privacy
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seems to be a caveat to the general protections that the Report seeks to es-
tablish. This caveat leaves open the door to privacy intrusion in the sphere
of personal medical information, and implicitly acknowledges that the pro-
posal does not intend to create absolute privacy rights regarding one's
medical history. Secretary Shalala describes this idea as follows:
These four principles-Boundaries, Security, Consumer Control and Ac-
countability-must be weighed against the fifth principle, Public Responsibil-
ity.
Just like our free speech rights, privacy rights can never be absolute. We
have other critical-yet often competing-interests and goals. We must bal-
ance our protections of privacy with our public responsibility to support na-
tional priorities-public health, research, quality care, and our fight against
health care fraud and abuse.
As a major payer of health care in this country, our Department is acutely
aware of the need to use health records to fulfill those responsibilities.
86
It is the fifth principle which serves as the justification for the law en-
forcement exception. This exception is discussed in the following Section.
3. The HHS Report's Law Enforcement Exception
As the discussion above demonstrates, much of the reasoning behind
the Report's recommendations is centered on the need for laws that will
protect individual health information privacy in the face of the rapid tech-
nological changes and computerization of medical records. This attitude is
clear from the plain language in HIPAA's section 26287 and the stated in-
tentions of the Report. For example, the Report asserts that
as the health care system becomes more integrated and more computerized, it
is becoming difficult to determine the appropriate person or place where our
health information can be accessed or controlled.
For th[is and other] reasons, [HHS is] recommending that Congress replace
the ineffective use of authorizations with a system of Federal legislative con-
trols on the use of health information collected by health care payers and pro-
viders.
88
Moreover, during her testimony, Secretary Shalala argued for a national
standard for confidentiality, 89 and stressed that the HHS Report's recom-
86 Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 23.
87 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that section 262 of HIPAA focuses
on the need to protect the security of electronic health information).
88 HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. I.B.
89 See Medical Records: HHS Proposes Privacy Standards, HEALTH LINE, Sept. 12,
1997, at 1, 1 ("[Shalala] said that 'by establishing a basic national standard of protection there
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mendations for new, strong federal standards represented a needed response
to what she described as "revolutions in biology, communications, and
health care."90 Shalala emphasized the need for standardized and stringent
national protections with a "fundamental" rhetorical question: "Will our
health records be used to heal us or reveal us? The American people want
to know. As a nation, we must decide." 91 Curiously, however, this attitude
did not justify a federal standard governing law enforcement's use of private
medical records. Despite the fact that the rapid computerization of health
records ostensibly could also facilitate previously unimagined and inappro-
priate usage by law enforcement, 92 HHS chose to leave this area of medical
records privacy untouched.93
Further, the reasoning for this unusual treatment seems at odds with an-
other premise underlying the Report's call for federal-level standards-the
incomplete and inconsistent nature of the "patchwork of State health privacy
laws." 94 The Report declares that current state protections are inadequate,
and that because state laws "vary greatly in scope and strength .... the
situation has been described as 'a morass of erratic law, both statutory and
judicial, defining the confidentiality of health information."' 95 However,
will be clear guidance and significant incentives for the fair treatment of personal informa-
tion .... '").
90 Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 25.
91 Id. at20.
92 See, e.g., infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text (discussing potential law enforce-
ment abuse in a situation where HHS workers inadvertently discover criminal activity while
reviewing medical records for other purposes).
93 One reason this may have occurred is that Secretary Shalala bowed to pressure from
the Department of Justice, which was eager to protect law enforcement's easy access to pri-
vate medical records. See Privacy Proposals Include Controversial Surprises, HEALTH DATA
MGMT., Oct. 1997, at 1, 1 ("Capitol Hill insiders say Shalala lost a battle with the Justice De-
partment over the law enforcement/intelligence provisions.").
94 HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. I.J.
95 Id. pt. .B (quoting WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA EXCHANGE, REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES app. 4, Confidentiality
and Antitrust Issues 5 (1992)). The HHS Report is hardly the first authority to reach this
conclusion. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CTR., LEGISLATIVE SURVEY OF STATE CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS, WITH SPECIFIC
EMPHASIS ON HIV AND IMMUNIZATION, REPORT TO THE U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION Er AL., pt. 4, § VIII.A (1996) (last modified Mar. 1, 1999)
<http:l/www.epic.orglprivacy/medicalledcesurvey.html> (noting that "[l]aws protecting the
confidentiality of health care information vary markedly from state to state," and describing
the problems this causes for patients' privacy rights and other issues it raises for various inter-
ested parties in the health care delivery system). Indeed, this 1996 legislative survey noted
with alarm the high degree of variation of statutory protection afforded by the contradictions
in the legal frameworks within individual states. See id. at pt. 4, § IV (noting that states' laws
are often internally inconsistent, conferring varying degrees of privacy protection to different
types of information, and adopting inconsistent approaches to different state government
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this diverges sharply from Secretary Shalala's assertion that current law en-
forcement access to private medical records operates within a set of "well-
established procedures of the criminal justice system." 96 As Part II of this
Comment shows, few, if any, legal commentators would share Secretary
Shalala's belief that the laws and cases addressing law enforcement's use of
private medical information are well-defined.9 7
The Report's recommendations concerning law enforcement's access to
private medical records, however, reflect Secretary Shalala's sentiments.
Simply put, the Report proposes making no changes to the existing legal
landscape regarding law enforcement use of medical records. On more than
one occasion, the Report notes that its authors "are not recommending any
changes to existing legal constraints that govern access to or use of patient
information by law enforcement agencies."98 Instead, its goal is much less
ambitious, recommending "that the [Report's proposed] legislation maintain
current practices by permitting disclosure of health information to law en-
forcement authorities."
99
The Report, however, does recommend a solution for improper privacy
violations that may arise in the law enforcement exception context: punish
wrongdoers. The Report suggests penalties for the inappropriate use of pri-
vate medical information.100 Both the Report and Secretary Shalala's testi-
mony before Congress make clear that these penalties should apply equally
to law enforcement representatives and any other information abusers.
10 1
practices and protocols concerning public health information). Such findings have led Robert
Gellman to observe that state-level frameworks result in "a legal, political and practical
mess." Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level?:
Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 137
(1996).9 Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 24.
97 Indeed, Secretary Shalala herself seems conflicted on this matter. During her congres-
sional testimony, she stated:
If a law enforcement officer in this country does find other criminal activity, there
are other laws that affect how they can use that information and the courts have spo-
ken on that subject sometimes in inconsistent ways.... [B]ut I think the important
thing is that we believe that there are laws that restrict and clarify what law en-
forcement officers do in terms of their access.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). It is difficult to grasp how inconsistent judicial results can lend
clari to law enforcement action in these matters.
9 HIHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. II.E(9).99 Id. pt. II.E(10).
100 See id. pt. ll.H (recommending civil and criminal penalties for violations of confiden-
tiality of health information).
See Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 9-10 ("[A] law enforcement officer who
acted in an inappropriate way-who did not have a justification for going to look at some-
one's medical record, would be subject to criminal penalties, including jail as well as fines.");
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This solution seems overly simplistic, however, especially when compared
with the more comprehensive, principled approach taken in the over-
whelming majority of the Report. A host of logical and practical flaws
seem possible given this superficial treatment of the law enforcement ex-
ception issues.
102
There is no doubt that there exists a logical tension between the ration-
ale, approach, and resulting recommendations related to the law enforce-
ment exception on the one hand, and the balance of the Report on the other.
To a certain extent, this is unavoidable. Despite the fact that it runs counter
to the other four principles guiding the Report, at its core the fifth principle
of public responsibility seems justified and acceptable-law enforcement
must have a defined exception to the general rule that health records can
only be used for health-related purposes. It is the Report's treatment of this
principle, more than the principle itself, that contradicts the spirit and rea-
soning of the Report's other recommendations. Just as the changes in health
information usage and database technology justify a reevaluation of the laws
governing such usage, it seems logical that the law enforcement exception
in this area of medical records privacy could also benefit from review and
standardization. The balance of this Comment will review current law to
test the Report's assertion that the exception is well-defined, and to deter-
mine whether current legal standards appropriately protect individuals' pri-
vacy interests in light of the profound technological changes-something
that is assumed by the recommendations of the Report. Additionally, this
Comment suggests and defends some possible improvements in the Re-
port's stance on law enforcement use of medical records.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCEPTION TO
MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY
If the Report accepts the current state of the law enforcement exception,
then it seems logical to review the present legal frameworks of the excep-
tion in order to determine if they sufficiently protect individual medical rec-
ords privacy. In general, the exceptions represent a patchwork structure, as
the Report concedes when assessing medical records privacy law in gen-
eral. l1 3 The sprawling nature of the law, however, does not mean that all of
the developments are hostile to individuals' medical records privacy rights
HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. II.E(IO) ("[O]ur recommendations would make obtaining
health information under false pretenses be a Federal felony.").
102 For a critique of the Report's stance, see infra Part III, which outlines arguments for
strengthening the law enforcement exception of the HHS proposal.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing the confusion of varying state
statutory and judicial medical privacy laws).
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with respect to law enforcement use; indeed some strong statements and
hopeful interpretations exist.10 4 This Part briefly outlines the possible inter-
pretations of the current law regarding the law enforcement exception.
First, it discusses two constitutional issues: the existence of a constitutional
right to medical records privacy independent of the Fourth Amendment, and
the extent of the Fourth Amendment protection against medical record
searches and seizures. Next, it reviews applicable federal laws. Finally, it
considers the relevant issues in state law, including both state statutes and
case law regarding potential protections.
A. An Independent Constitutional Right to Privacy
Although the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures may create the most likely source of constitutional
protection against wrongful law enforcement access to private medical rec-
ords, other constitutional protections also exist. This Subpart provides a
brief history of the judicial evolution of these protections. First, it offers in-
sight into the growth and development of non-Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for medical records privacy. Second, it examines later cases that ap-
pear to restrict or undercut these potential protections in the medical records
area.
1. The History and Developments of Penumbral Privacy Rights
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy
independent of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.10 5 The
104 See, e.g., infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (discussing the penumbral con-
stitutional privacy protections implied by the Whalen v. Roe decision); infra note 149 and ac-
companying text (citing cases that support a Fourth Amendment basis for medical records
privacy protections); infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (approving of the analytical
framework of protection espoused in Katz v. United States, and demonstrating HIPAA's con-
sistency with this framework); infra notes 184-90 (discussing the privacy protections included
in the Freedom of Information Act applicable to medical records held by the government);
infra notes 195-206 (describing tort- and contract-based common law protections against im-
proper medical records use and/or disclosure).
105 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a state law prohibiting
abortion under any circumstances except to save the life of the mother was an unlawful inva-
sion of an individual's constitutional, non-Fourth Amendment privacy rights); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (using penumbral privacy rights to invalidate a state law pro-
hibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (striking down a state statute prohibiting sexually obscene material in a
private residence using non-Fourth Amendment privacy right justifications); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state statute barring interracial marriage using
non-Fourth Amendment privacy rights reasoning); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
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relevant cases, although rarely touching on the specific issue of medical re-
cords privacy, do address squarely the fundamental issue of government in-
trusion into personal information1 0 6 Medical records surely fall into this
category.107 This line of cases really begins with an idea presented in a
landmark law review article entitled The Right to Privacy, written by Sam-
uel Warren and Louis Brandeis.108 Warren and Brandeis argued that there
should exist an individual right to privacy, even where the harm is solely
intangible, such as harm to one's feelings. 1°9 Presaging the justifications for
the current HHS Report, the authors argued that technological advances
such as cameras and high-speed newspaper printing presses "have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life."110 This right was not a
mere property right, such as an interest in one's personal papers or letters.
11'
Rather, it protected the underlying intellectual product, which arose from
the solace of preventing public disclosure of such information."
2
Far removed in time from this foundation, Griswold v. Connecticut1
3
was the first case that sought to develop an implicit constitutional right of
485 (1965) (holding that various constitutional "penumbral rights" exist to provide privacy
protection and render a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutional).
106 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding "that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision" and limits government intrusion into this decision); Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453 (holding that the right of privacy extends to an individual's right to be free from
"unwarranted government intrusion" when making personal decisions such as "whether to
bear or beget a child"); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 (noting that it is impermissible for the gov-
ernment to premise legislation on controlling the private information contained in "a person's
private thoughts"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (noting that "[v]arious [penumbral] guarantees
create zones of privacy" protected from government intrusion).
107 Even cases generally hostile to privacy interests in medical records concede this point.
See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that there exists a presumptive constitutional privacy right in one's medical rec-
ordst 5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
109 See id. at 197-99 & n.1 (arguing that a general right to privacy affords a remedy for
mental pain).
110 Id. at 195.
III See id. at 201 ("What is the thing which is protected? Surely not the intellectual act of
recording.., but that fact itself. It is not the intellectual product, but the domestic occur-
rence.").
112 See id. at 201-05 ("[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions... so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforce-
ment of the more general right of the individual to be let alone.").
113 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contracep-
tives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy).
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privacy independent of the Fourth Amendment.1 14  Griswold signaled an
analytical shift from the Fourth Amendment cases' rights-based approach
toward a broader interpretation of constitutional interests. It balanced these
interests against the interests of government.1 5 Some commentators have
argued that as a result of this shift in reasoning, "the clear trend has been the
expansion of privacy rights." '116 Although the Court in Griswold issued four
separate opinions in defense of its judgment, the ruling demonstrated that
there existed a privacy right distinct from the Fourth Amendment.1 7 Later
cases, such as Loving v. Virginia,"' Stanley v. Georgia,"' and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 12 upheld and invigorated the privacy rights of individuals. Each
case recognized a legitimate constitutional privacy right by weighing that
right against the governmental interests in limiting or intruding upon it.1
21
In Roe v. Wade, the Court concluded that the balance weighed against the
state's interest in protecting potential life by banning abortions. 12 Roe
served as a strong statement in support of the privacy right and its relative
weight when compared to governmental interests.
114 See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 21 (1997) (arguing that Griswold began the "trend [toward] the expan-
sion of privacy rights").115 See id. (discussing the Court's shift toward "a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis which
balances the costs to privacy and the benefits to public safety").
116 Id. DeCew argues convincingly that the reasoning in Griswold was anticipated by
similar constitutional arguments protecting privacy in the Georgia case, Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See DECEW, supra note 114, at 23 (dis-
cussing the "natural basis for connecting the two cases").
381 U.S. at 485 (noting the validity of "penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose'
(citation omitted)).
118 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down a Virginia statute outlawing interracial marriage
based on the Court's recognition of a penumbral privacy right).
119 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (citing a penumbral privacy right as an important justifica-
tion for allowing obscene materials in an individual's home).
120 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (citing a penumbral privacy right as the rationale for al-
lowing distribution of contraceptive devices).
See, e.g., id. at 453 (supporting a right to marital privacy, including the use of contra-
ception); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567 (supporting a right to private possession of obscene matter);
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (supporting a right to marry interacially).
410 U.S. 113, 150, 162-63 (1973) (acknowledging a state interest in protecting poten-
tial life, but concluding that this interest does not outweigh completely the privacy right of the
mother). Note, however, that since Roe, the Court has issued numerous opinions that resolve
this general balancing in favor of the governmental intrusion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (finding that Pennsylvania's informed consent restrictions on
abortion rights did not impose an undue burden on the individual's constitutional privacy
rights espoused in Roe); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989)
(finding that a state's interest in promulgating a law banning public employees from per-
forming nontherapeutic abortions in public facilities outweighed the individual's constitu-
tional interest); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy).
1999] LA WENFORCEMENTACCESS TO MEDICAL RECORDS
With these developments as a foundation, the Supreme Court in Whalen
v. Roe issued its most comprehensive definition of the privacy right thus far,
by acknowledging both an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters" and an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."' 23 This case is of particular relevance in the medical
records privacy arena since it involved the constitutionality of a New York
law mandating centralized computer record keeping of prescriptions for
specific addictive, but lawful, drugs, complete with patient-identifiable in-
formation. 124 Although the Court upheld the statute at issue, 125 the case is
encouraging for a number of reasons. First, the Court recognized a more
comprehensive privacy right (including an "interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters") that could encompass one's right to avoid law en-
forcement intrusion into personal medical information. 126  Second, the
Court's balancing focused heavily on the potential harms caused by the
collection and maintenance of such a database; only after the Court was
satisfied that the privacy risks were obviated did it acknowledge the state's
interest in collecting such data.127 Finally, Justice Brennan's concurrence
recognized that the accessibility of the data was troubling, and indicated that
future technological developments might create the need to revisit this bal-
ancing and to restrict the government's use of technology that would place
privacy rights at risk.128  Although the result of the Court's decision in
Whalen might seem to limit the potency of this penumbral right in the area
of law enforcement's use of medical records, the case at least established
that such a right might outweigh similar governmental intrusions into per-
sonal health information in the future.
123 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977).
124 See id. at 591 (addressing "whether the State of New York may record, in a central-
ized computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a
doctor's prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and unlawful market").
W2 See id. at 603-04 (finding that the potential privacy threats inherent in New York
State's Controlled Substances Act did not rise to an unconstitutional "invasion of [privacy]
rights1 or libert[ies]").
Id. at 599.
127 See id. at 593-94 (finding that protections such as locking the data tape in a storage
facility when not in use, running the data off-line, and providing access to only a limited
number of officials were sufficient to ensure confidentiality).
128 See id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I am not prepared to say that future devel-
opments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.").
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2. Post-Whalen: Developments Limiting the Scope of a Constitutional
Right to Medical Records Privacy
Commentators have severely criticized the penumbral right of privacy
since its inception because it is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, and
because courts have asserted it in a vast array of cases. 129 Since the Whalen
decision, the Supreme Court has been more reluctant to invigorate the pri-
vacy interests of individuals in the medical records context. Two cases in
particular illustrate the judicial balancing framework and ultimate lessening
of privacy interests in health information. 130 These cases provide essential
insight into the potential value of this independent constitutional right in the
law enforcement context.
Despite Whalen's cautionary language against doing so, lower courts
have read the Whalen decision as severely limiting the right to informational
privacy, thereby shifting the balance strongly in favor of governmental in-
terests. According to the Third Circuit in United States v. Westinghouse, a
court should analyze seven factors to determine the extent of this constitu-
tional privacy right: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information the
record does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship
in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7)
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or
other recognizable public interest favoring access. 131 The Westinghouse
court considered a scenario closely analogous to the law enforcement use of
private medical records. In that case, the federal government, through the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), served a
subpoena on Westinghouse for employees' medical records in connection
with an investigation concerning a possible workplace hazard. 32 The court
concluded that the subpoena was valid, approving the governmental interest
129 See, e.g., Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1967) (criti-
cizini the early penumbral privacy rights cases).
1 See Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding that the employer's need to access prescription records outweighed the em-
ployee's privacy interest in a case in which an employer discovered that an employee had
AIDS based on the employee's drug purchases made through the employee health plan);
United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that employees'
constitutional privacy rights were not sufficient to overcome a governmental demand for their
confidential medical records for investigatory purposes); see also infra notes 134-42 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Doe and Westinghouse cases).
131 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (setting forth the analysis to determine the extent
of a privacy right).
P32 See id. at 573 (discussing NIOSH's investigation of Westinghouse's Trafford plant).
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in NIOSH's investigatory efforts despite simultaneously recognizing the
sensitive and personal nature of the information. 133 It is important to note
the level of deference given to the governmental agency and its aims. This
is especially important in the law enforcement context, because NIOSH
acted as an investigatory body in this instance.
The Third Circuit in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority emphasized the shift away from informational privacy rights
and toward valid governmental interests. This case also involved a govern-
ment entity, SEPTA, in its role as both employer and investigatory body.
Here, the plaintiff Doe brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983131 against
SEPTA when he discovered that his employer obtained his confidential
medical records as a part of its effort to monitor the use and potential abuse
of its prescription drug plan.136 The court, considering the Westinghouse
factors, upheld SEPTA's right to collect and monitor such data for these
purposes, showing deference to the government even where individually-
identifiable patient information was collected improperly. 137  The court
noted that "[s]elf-insured employers have the same rights as [government
insurers and providers like Medicare and Medicaid],"138 which routinely
obtain and investigate similar data. It acknowledged that, although many of
the factors weighed in favor of Doe's privacy rights, the seventh Westing-
house factor (relating to the public interest in intrusion) outweighed them.
39
This result, and other cases supporting similar conclusions regarding the
penumbral informational privacy right,140 have caused at least one com-
133 See id. at 578-80 ("[We believe that the strong public interest in facilitating the re-
search and investigations of NIOSH justify this minimal intrusion into the privacy which sur-
rounds the employees' medical records .... ).
134 72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (holding that a government employer's need for access to em-
ployee prescription records for investigative purposes outweighed the employee's interest in
confidentiality).
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (encompassing and promulgating civil rights protec-
tions).
136 See Doe, 72 F.3d at 1135-36 (discussing the rationale behind SEPTA's review of
Rite-Aid's prescription drug utilization reports).
137 See id. at 1143 (reversing the district court's judgment and remanding for entry of
judgment for the defendants as a matter of law).
138 Id. at 1141.
139 See id. (discussing the employer's "legitimate need for monitoring the costs and uses
of their employee benefit programs"). Judge Lewis's opinion in Doe points out this relative
weighing in succinct fashion. See id. at 1147 (Lewis, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[Tihe
majority places a disproportionate emphasis on factor seven [(the public interest in disclo-
sure)], so much so that the remaining elements of the balancing test [(the individual's privacy
interests)] become practically irrelevant to its analysis.").
140 Lawrence Gostin has observed that "[i]ndividuals asserting a constitutional right to
informational privacy are unlikely to obtain a remedy save in cases where the State fails to
assert any significant interest or is particularly careless in disclosing highly sensitive informa-
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mentator to note that when a "policy development on health information
pays some attention to privacy and security concerns, the government is
likely to prevail.' 141 Thus, when courts employ a flexible balancing ap-
proach and the government can assert some legitimate purpose, many pri-
vacy interests appear insufficient to overcome the courts' deference to the
State.
Whalen set the Court's deferential tone in considering the weight ac-
corded to governmental activities when it observed that numerous state ac-
tions "require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information,
much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed."142 As Westinghouse and Doe demonstrate, this defer-
ence has become almost impossible to overcome in the balancing frame-
work typically used when courts consider the penumbral informational pri-
vacy right. It seems likely that almost any police action intruding upon
private medical records would currently survive such judicial review.
B. The Fourth Amendment Cases
The purpose of this Subpart is not to review the vast body of Fourth
Amendment law in general, but instead to demonstrate the unresolved and
imperfect nature of search and seizure law in the confidential medical rec-
ords context. 143 First, this Subpart presents cases both undercutting and
supporting a right to medical records privacy in the law enforcement con-
text. Second, this Subpart discusses some basic critiques of the reasoning
underlying these cases.
1. Ambivalence in the Case Law
An illustrative case that limits individuals' medical records privacy and
expands law enforcement's use of such information is People v. Perlos1
44
In this case, several defendants were involved in automobile accidents as
tion." Gostin, supra note 8, at 498 n.211. Gostin cites three recent cases to support this
statement. See id. (citing Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990),
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988), and Carter v. Broadlawns Medical
Center, 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987), to support the proposition that only a complete
absence of state interest will allow individual privacy rights to prevail).
141 Id. at 498 (noting that courts allow states wide latitude in protecting and monitoring
public health).
142 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
143 An excellent and comprehensive overview of Fourth Amendment law, however, can
be found in 1 JoHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1991).
144 462 N.W.2d 310, 323 (Mich. 1990) (holding that a state statute requiring hospital per-
sonnel to report blood alcohol test results to prosecutors without a warrant does not violate
constitutional search and seizure protections).
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drivers, and when taken to the hospital for treatment, doctors performed
tests on their blood to measure alcohol content.145 Health care providers
turned over the results of these tests to law enforcement pursuant to a state
statute which required that the health care provider giving treatment "shall
disclose the results of the analysis" to appropriate law enforcement authori-
ties. 46 The court directly considered the issue of the defendants' privacy
interest in their test results, finding the law enforcement's use of these rec-
ords acceptable, and noting:
There is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the test results.
Clearly, defendants cannot claim ownership or possession of the results. Also,
as stated in [United States v.] Miller, information revealed to a third party,
even for a limited purpose, can properly be conveyed to the government even
if the information was revealed in confidence. In these cases, blood was taken
for a limited purpose, medical treatment.... [T]he information conveyed was
not privileged. Under the Miller analysis, once the hospitals obtained the re-
sults for medical purposes, it would have been unreasonable for defendants to
assume that the results would necessarily remain private. At the very least,
various hospital employees become aware of the test results in the normal
course of their work. Society places a risk on persons in their dealings with
third1 arties that information conveyed to third parties will not remain pri-
vate.
Note that other cases lend support to the decision and reasoning in
Perlos,148 while clearly contrary opinions exist. For example, the court in
Commonwealth v. Riedel found that, in a situation where law enforcement
authorities searched an individual's medical records, the defendant did have
"a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records," although the
court found that the law enforcement search was lawful on the less contro-
versial Fourth Amendment grounds of probable cause and exigent circum-
stances.
14 9
145 See id. at 312 ("These [blood] tests were made for medical treatment.").
146 Id. at 323 (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625a(9) (1982)).
147 Id. at 321 (footnotes omitted).
148 See, e.g., State v. Dyal, 478 A.2d 390, 395 (N.J. 1984) ("Mhe statutory patient-
physician privilege does not prevent a blood test of one who is arrested on probable cause to
believe he is intoxicated and who is taken by police in custody for diagnosis."); State v. Jen-
kins, 259 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Wis. 1977) ("Mhe defendant had no reasonable expectation of
priva concerning those [blood alcohol] test results.").
651 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa. 1994). Courts have also used similar reasoning to find that a
hospital patient has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the blood taken for treatment itself,
so that a police search inducing hospital personnel to supply some of this blood for alcohol
content testing is invalid and illegal. See State v. Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (recognizing "society's regard for this expectation [of privacy], as evidenced by
the Texas Medical Practice Act'), overruled by State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997), reh'g denied (1998).
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Cases in this area are not uniform in their treatment of the medical rec-
ords privacy right. Marked differences exist in how courts assess the ex-
pectation of privacy, the interests of law enforcement, and the scope of any
possible intrusion. As a result, although some support for a vigorous pro-
tection of medical records privacy may exist within this Fourth Amendment
framework, this support seems uneven and questionable at best.
2. Problems with the Miller Reasoning in the Modem
Health Information Context
Many of the cases centering on medical records privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context use reasoning based on United States v. Miller.'50 This
case dealt with the validity of subpoenas ordering production of all records
of the bank accounts held by two of the defendant's banks. 1 ' The banks
produced these records on microfilm, and at trial the defendant unsuccess-
fully sought suppression of these records, asserting that the subpoenas were
defective.152  The appeals court reversed, 153 but the Supreme Court found
that there was "no intrusion into any area in which [the defendant] had a
protected Fourth Amendment interest."'
15 4
The defendant appealed to the reasoning in Katz v. United States,1
5 5
which expanded the Court's previously restrictive view that "'property in-
terests control the right of the Government to search and seize,' ' 156 and
more importantly held that searches and seizures become unreasonable
when the government's activities run afoul of the "privacy upon
which... [individuals] justifiably rel[y].' 57 The Supreme Court in Miller,
however, chose to focus on another issue raised in Katz, noting that the Katz
Court "also stressed that '[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
ISO 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor had no protectible Fourth
Amendment interest in bank records, consisting of microfilms, checks, deposit slips and other
records related to the depositor's accounts at two banks, despite the requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act and that the records were obtained by allegedly defective subpoenas).
151 See id. at 436 (observing that the case arose when Miller "moved to suppress copies
of checks and other bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective subpoe-
nas.., served upon two banks at which he had accounts").
152 See id.
153 See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the trial
court should not have admitted Miller's bank checks into evidence), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
1 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
I55 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the government's listening to and recording of a
defendant's phone conversation from a public telephone booth using electronic surveillance
equipmnent constituted an improper search and seizure without judicial sanction).
15I Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
'5 Id.
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lic... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.' ... We must ex-
amine the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in order
to determine whether there is a legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concern-
ing their contents." 158 The Miller Court went on to state that in reviewing
the nature and content of bank records, it "perceive[d] no legitimate 'ex-
pectation of privacy' in their contents." 159 Indeed, the Court observed that
[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor-
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court has
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.
160
Despite severe criticism of the result and reasoning in Miller,161 and the
harm it does to Fourth Amendment protections of privacy, the essence of
the case remains good law. 162 More importantly, this case often serves as
the philosophical foundation of court decisions which attack and undermine
the expectation of privacy that individuals often assert with respect to law
enforcement intrusion into personal health information."' Within both the
medical records arena and the health care provider-patient relationship, as in
the financial records context, a loss of privacy to unrestricted government
159 425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 443 (citations omitted). Note that in support of this statement, the Court relied
on the line of "false-friend" cases concerning government informants' relaying of information
received in supposed confidence. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)
(holding that the use of testimony of a government informer concerning conversations be-
tween the defendant and the informer did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the de-
fendant).
161 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 22-29 (1983) (noting that "[r]eactions to the decision in Miller have
been overwhelmingly negative" and challenging the finding in Miller that individuals assume
the risk of disclosure of private information that they share with another).
162 Although Miller's holding as it relates to financial records has been limited by the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994), the case is
still relevant for medical records privacy. In fact, commentators have argued that a similar
result to that in Miller would occur if an analogous case involving medical information were
to come before the Supreme Court, since Miller effectively governs the medical records con-
text. See, e.g., Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physi-
cian in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REv. 255, 290-91 (1984) ("As a practical
matter, in the absence of a statute or a definitive court decision, the Miller decision is effec-
tively being applied when medical records are subpoenaed." (citations omitted)).
63 This is apparent in the Perlos decision discussed earlier. See supra notes 144-49 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Perlos decision limits individuals' medical records
privacy and expands law enforcement's use of such information).
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access would cripple the privacy rights supposedly protected by the Fourth
Amendment and other facets of the Constitution. If anything, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that individuals might expect that a higher level of pri-
vacy will be afforded to their medical history. Moreover, both financial and
medical records are subject to tremendous technological advancements that
have spurred massive computerized record keeping.' 64 Unfortunately, the
post-Miller evolution of law enforcement's access to private medical infor-
mation has left few real privacy protections in this area.
165
The decision in Katz properly assessed the ownership and property fac-
ets of the Fourth Amendment protections by noting that such concepts can-
not "serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem";
166
yet, the Miller Court asserted that there can be no protected privacy interest
where there is neither "ownership nor possession" of the thing sought to be
kept private.167 This logic fails to grasp the realities of changes in technol-
ogy and societal structure, and has led to substantial erosion of privacy pro-
tections in the medical records-law enforcement area. Of course, one could
consider some information collected by organizations in the course of deal-
ings between patients and health care providers properly within the zone of
information "a person knowingly exposes to the public,"'168 and therefore
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. On the other hand, informa-
tion directly related to one's health-information gleaned from privileged
communications between patient and doctor-should not be so easily classi-
fied as such. 169 Rather, the approach set forth in Katz seems more appropri-
ate. In Katz, the court focused on two issues: (1) whether the defendant
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" in the records, and
164 See Hellwege, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that the electronic storage and transmis-
sion of medical records creates an opportunity for people to inappropriately access the infor-
mation).
165 Multiple sources have noted this reality. See, e.g., Thurman v. Texas, 861 S.W.2d 96,
101 (Tex. App. 1993, no writ) (concurring opinion) ("The unrestricted use of grand jury sub-
poenas to obtain medical records is a serious threat to privacy. There is almost no limit on
what can be obtained without the knowledge or approval of any court, any grand jury, any
supervisor in a prosecutor's office, or the person affected."); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 377 (1977) (concluding after
significant research that the subpoena was a mere "administrative tool" used by law enforce-
ment to access individual medical records to circumvent Fourth Amendment restrictions).
166 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967).
167 425 U.S. at 440.
168 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
169 Note that in Miller, law enforcement authorities proceeded under color of a subpoena,
but the reasoning in Miller has been used to support information gathering using much more
controversial means. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (using
Miller to uphold the validity of information acquired by IRS agents via burglary).
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(2) if so, whether that expectation is one that "society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.',
170
In general, the social impetus behind HIPAA and the HHS Report help
resolve these two questions. Although the first prong of the Katz analysis is
dependent on the expectations of the individual defendant, the public senti-
ment that resulted in the Act's confidentiality protections and subsequent
HHS recommendations indicates that, in most instances, individuals subjec-
tively expect, and seek to insure, medical records privacy.17 ' Such public
opinion is a clearer response to the second inquiry in Katz: society appears
willing to accept as reasonable general principles that strengthen medical
record confidentiality laws. What remains at issue, then, is how these Katz
questions would be answered in the specific context of law enforcement ac-
cess to medical records. Thus, society must determine whether or under
what circumstances law enforcement should be allowed access to this per-
sonal information. Currently, law enforcement officers can gain access to
private medical information with relative ease, given the weak state of con-
stitutional search-and-seizure protections for the privacy of medical infor-
mation.172 This reality, when coupled with the impending likelihood of fed-
eral legislation on this issue in the near future, creates an ideal opportunity
to reconsider our stance on law enforcement's ability to access this personal
information.
C. Federal Laws
Congress has enacted federal legislation that impacts individuals' health
information privacy and law enforcement's access to such records. The two
major statutes governing the issue are the Privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act. In addition, various other laws permit medical records re-
view by various federal agencies.
1. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 1974173 ("the Privacy Act") ensures that federal
agencies utilize fair information practices with regard to the collection,
management, use, and dissemination of any record within a system of rec-
170 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
171 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing public perception of medi-
cal records confidentiality).
172 See supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting that few protections exist against
law enforcement access).
173 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
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ords. 174 Subject to exemptions, the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of in-
formation to another person or agency without prior written consent by the
individual to whom the data relates.17 The Privacy Act allows an individ-
ual to review, copy, and correct mistakes in records pertaining to that indi-
vidual. v6 The law also prescribes limits on the collection and maintenance
of information by agencies, allowing agencies only to keep information that
is necessary for the purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
federal statute.
177
Federally run hospitals and health care providers and research organi-
zations which receive federal funding must maintain patient records that
comply with the Privacy Act. 17  It is not difficult, however, for agencies to
avoid the Privacy Act's central purpose of privacy protection. Federal or-
ganizations may disclose and use information for a so-called "routine use,"
so that health information can be used for any "purpose which is compatible
with the purpose for which [the health data] was collected.' 7'  This "rou-
tine use" exception would allow, for instance, HHS to use Medicare or
Medicaid databases as a monitoring and law enforcement tool to protect
against fraud and abuse, even if the original purpose of the files was to pro-
mote public and individual health.1
80
174 The term "record" is defined in the Privacy Act as follows:
mhe term 'record' means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an
individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his educa-
tion, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and
that contains his name, or the identifying numberl [or] symbol ... assigned to the
individual, such as a finger or voice print or photograph ....
Id. § 552a(aX4).
"System of records," in turn, is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) ("[The term 'system of
records' means a group of any records under the control of any agency from which informa-
tion is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, [or] sym-
bol.., assigned to the individual . .. ."). Note that individuals' confidential health informa-
tion currently collected by myriad federal agencies typically fits within this definitional
framework.
175 See id. § 552a(b) ("Conditions of disclosure").
176 See id. § 552a(d)(l)-(4) ("Access to records").
177 See id. § 552a(e) ("Agency requirements").
179 See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN
COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION, OTA-TCT-576, at 42 (1993) (stating that the Fed-
eral Privacy Act is applicable at hospitals that maintain registers of cancer patients pursuant to
a federal contract).
179 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7).
180 Indeed, one explanation for HHS's reluctance to draft strong recommendations which
would limit law enforcement access to private medical information is that HHS also fulfills a
significant law enforcement role itself with respect to Medicare and Medicaid fraud and does
not want to limit its own abilities in this area. Interview with Professor John Merz, Center for
Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania, in Phila., Pa. (Oct. 7, 1997).
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Finally, the Privacy Act provides substantial exceptions for law en-
forcement authorities. These exceptions effectively minimize any privacy
protection that the law might offer to individuals against improper law en-
forcement intrusion into their medical records. For example, any law en-
forcement agency of any governmental unit can acquire personal records
(including medical information) without notice or consent, merely if the
agency claims that such records will be used for "law enforcement activ-
ity.3' 181 A host of other law enforcement-related exceptions essentially
swallow the protections afforded by the Privacy Act with respect to law en-
forcement's access to medical information.
18 2
2. The Freedom of Information Act
The intent of the Freedom of Information Act183 ("FOIA") is to protect
the rights of citizens to obtain access to government information held by
federal agencies, and Congress did not intend for the Privacy Act to inter-
fere with these rights. However, FOIA contains a series of exemptions to its
general provisions that permits agencies to withhold information and thus
protect confidential records from improper disclosure. For example, HHS
typically uses Exemption Three'14 to protect health data, 8 5 and the Centers
for Disease Control ("CDC") has relied in the past on Exemption Four for
similar purposes. 1 6 Exemption Six protects "medical files" if their disclo-
sure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.' '1 s7 The Supreme Court has determined that when a party seeks FOIA
disclosure concerning individually identifiable records, a court must review
the potential disclosure by employing a balancing test that weighs the indi-
vidual's privacy right against the public's interest in the information in
question.1
88
181 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).
182 For an excellent overview of how these exceptions interrelate, see GUIDEBOOK TO
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AcTs 55-57 (Robert F. Bouchard & Justin D.
Franklin eds., 1980).
183 5 U.S.C. § 552.
184 See id. § 552(b)(3) (exempting data specifically excluded from FOIA disclosure re-
quirements by statute).
185 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247c(e)(5) (1994) (restricting disclosure of sexually-transmitted
disease records by HHS).
186 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (exempting "privileged or confidential" data). For an exam-
ple of the CDC's application of this exception, see Washington Post Co. v. United States De-
partment of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 252, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing the
evidentiary privilege of Exemption Four).
187 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
188 See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 370-75 (1976) (discussing the
balancing test employed in an Exemption Six inquiry).
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Although FOIA might provide some medical records protection against
law enforcement intrusion, its exemptions are subject to significant limita-
tions. Generally, agencies have the discretion, not the duty, to withhold dis-
closure if one of the exemptions applies, and an "agency decision is reversi-
ble only if arbitrary or capricious."'189 Also, reliance on a balancing test and
judicial review in this situation may not adequately protect individual pri-
vacy rights in the medical record-law enforcement arena.
190
3. Other Laws
Statutory initiatives over the past several years have expanded the
authority of federal agencies to obtain private medical records in a host of
instances, often for monitoring and law enforcement purposes. As Robert
Gellman notes, "The growth of government involvement in health matters
has resulted in an expansion of the power of government agencies to compel
the production of records."'' For instance, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion enjoys a legal right to the information and records collected in connec-
tion with new drug trials, 9 2 and HHS officials enjoy subpoena power for
both the administration of Medicare 193 and the detection of fraud and
abuse. 194 These are only a few of the numerous examples of this type of
statutorily based power.
D. State-Level Legal Frameworks
Although legal developments in state courts and legislatures have pro-
duced some protection for individuals' medical histories, these sources of
law are characterized more by their diversity and conflicting standards than
by the quality of protection they afford. In particular, the cases and state
laws offer little additional support for medical records protection from law
189 GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS, supra note
182, at 62 (footnote omitted).
190 As support for this assertion, Gostin cites the decision in United States v. Providence
Hospital, 507 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1981), noting that the holding of this case validated an
IRS subpoena of hospital substance abuse records because this law enforcement interest out-
weilged the individual privacy interests involved. See Gostin, supra note 8, at 503 & n.251.
Gellman, supra note 162, at 287.
192 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (1994) (regulating access to records pertaining to drug appli-
cations).
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1994) (giving the HHS secretary the subpoena power in
Medicare investigations by incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) into the Medicare laws).
194 See Inspector General Act of 1978, §§ 2, 6(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 3, at 1381, 1386 (1994) (providing for an "Inspector General" of
HI-S, and giving subpoena power to this office to "prevent and detect fraud and abuse").
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enforcement intrusion. This Subpart reviews tort- and contract-based cases
and considers relevant medical information privacy laws.
1. Cases
In general, when a patient believes that a health care provider has im-
properly divulged her private medical information, she may have as many as
five causes of action: breach of fiduciary relationship, negligence, breach of
implied term of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy. 95 Profes-
sional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are appropriate when
doctors disclose confidential information. 96 The essence of these two ap-
proaches is that the professional owes the patient a duty of confidentiality as
part of the proper care that accompanies a doctor-patient relationship.
1 97
Breach of contract claims rest on the notion that there exists an implied
contract made by the health care provider to maintain the confidentiality of
personal matters revealed during treatment. The rationale for the last two
theories, defamation and invasion of privacy, is that medical information is
"highly personal" and that patients have a right of protection against "mass
dissemination of information concerning private, personal matters."'
199
Defamation and invasion of privacy typically entail a balancing of the pa-
tient's privacy rights with competing interests. 200  As previously noted,
195 See Pamela K. Sutherland & Gina Yarbrough, High-Tech Gossip: Physician-Patient
Confidentiality and Computerized Managed Care, TRIAL, Nov. 1996, at 59 (listing the five
possible causes of action); see also Gostin, supra note 8, at 508-09 (listing four of the five
theories).
196 Commentators often combine negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims into a
single category, breach of confidentiality, when describing claims of wrongful disclosure of
confidential information. "The gravamen of both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
claims is that the professional owes [the] patient a duty of confidentiality within the bundle of
duties of proper care that accompanies a professional-patient relationship." Sutherland &
Yarbrough, supra note 195, at 60. Similarly, William Roach notes that when a "health care
provider... improperly discloses medical records information," the patient may sue on the
theory of "breach of confidentiality." WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR. & THE ASPEN HEALTH LAW
AND COMPLANCE CTR., MEDICAL REcORDs AND THE LAW 274 (3d ed. 1998).
197 See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (validating the fiduciary duty theory); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1962) (finding that there exists a "duty of total care" that includes a "duty to refuse
affirmative assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation").
198 See, e.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 (stating that the contract between doctor
and patient includes, "as an implied condition," an understanding that "confidential informa-
tion gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient's permission").
99 ROACH & THE ASPEN HEALTH LAW AND COMPLIANCE CTR., supra note 196, at 266.
200 See id. at 260-74 (noting that in defamation cases, a conditional privilege is available
to the defendant if she can prove that the information published affects a "sufficiently impor-
tant interest" of the publisher, and that in invasion of privacy cases, courts compare the right
to "protect against mass dissemination" with "matter[s] of legitimate public concern").
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courts tend to be deferential when weighing governmental interests in ob-
taining and using personal medical records;201 this is true in these specific
legal contexts as well.2 °2
Although these legal options are applicable to the disclosure of personal
medical information to law enforcement authorities, a number of practical
and legal limitations exist that undercut the efficacy of these protections.
Practically, such actions arise after an improper disclosure. This minimizes
the ability of the potential remedy to put the plaintiff in the position of
maintaining his privacy-it is simply too late, since the disclosure has oc-
curred. Also, the proliferation of computerized record keeping and database
management creates medical information sources-and potential abuse of
these sources-that are completely unknown to the patient.
Legally, exceptions to the general duty of confidentiality render these
common law actions useless. Gostin observes that "[t]hese claims are
weakened to the extent that courts recognize justifications [for disclosure]
other than consent. ' 20 3 Gostin goes on to identify a number of such excep-
tions that could apply to the law enforcement question and concludes that
although "common law protection of confidentiality probably provides the
most consistent safeguards, significant gaps exist in legal duties. 20 4 In-
deed, some of the most well-defined exceptions are those statutorily based
exclusions that center on law enforcement's ability to obtain and use confi-
205dential medical records. Finally, some legal scholars view with antipathy
the legal concept upon which these actions are founded-the privilege of
201 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing cases that seem to restrict protections for medical
records privacy because of court deference to governmental interests).
202 See, e.g., Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 1984) (discussing the balancing
test to be employed in the context of private business communications); ROACH & THE ASPEN
HEALTH LAW AND COMPLIANCE CTR., supra note 196, at 262-64 (discussing the strong
privilege protecting publications made in "legislative, judicial, and administrative proceed-
ings" and noting that a qualified privilege exists for other public acts).
203 Gostin, supra note 8, at 509.
204 Id. at 510.
205 The subpoena power that many federal agencies enjoy is an example of a statute-
based exclusion. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing statutory initiatives giving federal agencies
the power to obtain private medical records). Also, a number of more specific exceptions ex-
ist in state statutes, including physician reporting requirements for gunshot wounds, child
abuse, and communicable diseases. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 162, at 274 & n.78 ("Every
state requires health care providers to report selected identifiable patient information to state
agencies."). The Perlos decision discussed in Part ll.B.1 dealt with a Michigan statute re-
quiring physicians to take blood from auto accident victims, analyze it for alcohol content,
and submit results to the police. See People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990); supra
notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
1999] LAWENFORCEMENTACCESS TO MEDICAL RECORDS 1047
confidentiality between doctor and patient.206 As a result, these common
law-based approaches tend to offer few restrictions on law enforcement's
access to and use of medical records.
2. State Statutes
There is tremendous variation in the level of protection afforded indi-
viduals by state laws governing medical records privacy. When the law is
comprehensive and well-considered, it can provide substantial protections.
Often, more complete legislative efforts prohibit providers from disclosing
identifiable information excepting only the situation where patients provide
consent for such disclosures, or under a relatively small number of clearly
defined exceptions in the law.
20 7
More typically, state "practice acts" that license doctors and other
health care providers or state laws that regulate hospitals frequently contain
language restricting disclosures of health information.208 Unfortunately, the
ambiguity inherent in these legislative efforts often leaves the patient with
little concrete protection from law enforcement intrusions and the health
care provider with little guidance on what circumstances warrant protection
of a patient's health information. Indeed, Professor Gellman argues that this
lack of guidance is common, leaving providers with a morass of ethical and
legal problems when faced with a demand by law enforcement for private
209medical information. In addition, since many such legislative initiatives
206 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2285,
2380a (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (disputing, among other aspects of the privilege, whether
physician-patient communications should be confidential).
207 For examples of state laws that provide substantial and comprehensive protections of
medical privacy, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) and Confiden-
tiality of Health Care Information Act, RI. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-1 (1995). Commentators
observe that only a small number of state medical records confidentiality laws tend to fit this
description. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 162, at 278-79 ("A 1979 review of state laws con-
cerning health records confidentiality by the National Commission on Confidentiality of
Health Records (NCCHR) concluded that the great majority of states had not completed com-
prehensive statutes to regulate the record keeping practices of health care providers.");
Gilbert, supra note 32, at 93-94 ("[A] wide range of laws that attempt to preserve the confi-
dentiality of health information currently exist. Unfortunately, since there is no concerted
effort, there is no uniformity in the protection, or lack thereof, provided by these statutes.");
see also HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. I.B (describing the inadequacies of current state
regulation).
208 See, e.g., Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958) (discussing a violation of
Utah's practice act regarding physician-patient confidentiality).
209 See generally Gellman, supra note 162, at 255-94 (arguing that existing legal and
ethical guidance in general is inadequate to aid physicians in addressing confidentiality issues
raised when patient information is demanded or requested from them). In particular, Profes-
sor Gellman discusses the uncertainties that characterize the physician's decision to provide
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rest ideologically on the physician-patient privilege, the drastic narrowing of
this patient right and concomitant expansion of exceptions to this rule210
practically eviscerate the philosophical foundations upon which lie privacy
protections in the law enforcement-medical records area. The most impor-
tant aspect of this narrowing is that the privilege rarely applies outside of
the strict, two-person doctor-patient relationship. 211 Given the realities of
modem medical care delivery, where multiple teams of health care provid-
ers work with a single patient, and the expansion of authorized users of per-
sonal health care information, the privilege seems poorly equipped to pro-
tect individuals' privacy interests from law enforcement intrusion.
E. Concluding Observations About the Legal Landscape
From this overview, it becomes clear that the existing legal protections
afforded to individuals seeking to assert a privacy interest in their health re-
cords and prevent law enforcement intrusion are more disparate than stan-
dardized, more ambiguous than defined, more conflicted than robust, and
more incomplete than comprehensive. Importantly, the overwhelming ma-
jority of this body of law rests on principles and notions that may fail to
capture the imperatives laid bare by the rapid computerization and techno-
logical change in health care delivery. Given this evaluation, it seems curi-
ous and unfortunate that HHS missed the chance to devise substantive rec-
ommendations regarding law enforcement's use of private health
information. Part III of this Comment critiques the HHS proposal and ex-
isting laws generally, in an effort to extricate some potential concerns that
Congress might consider if and when it addresses the issue of health infor-
mation confidentiality.
information to law enforcement. See id. at 281-87 (discussing discretionary disclosures of a
physician).
210 Professor Gellman provides an excellent overview of these developments:
First, the privilege is a testimonial privilege. It only applies when the physician is
testifying in court or in related proceedings. This represents only a small fraction of
the disclosure demands that may confront a physician .... Second, the privilege is
much narrower than it seems. Statutory exemptions and judicial restrictions have so
limited the privilege in many states that the protections are only rarely avail-
able .... Third, the privilege does not exist in all states.
Id. at 272-73.
211 See Gostin, supra note 8, at 507 ("In many states, the privilege is limited to physicians
and therapists and does not extend to the great majority of health care professionals." (foot-
note omitted)).
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR STRENGTHENING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
EXCEPTION OF THE HHS PROPOSAL
If the dramatic changes in technology and health care delivery demand
a reevaluation and standardization of current privacy protections in this
area, and present legal protections against law enforcement intrusion can
plausibly be deemed inadequate or at least unclear, then it seems reasonable
to criticize the HHS Report for failing to address these realities in its pro-
posed law enforcement exception. In constructing this critique, one can
make a number of arguments. Briefly, the law enforcement exception's
perceived shortcomings can be grouped into five areas: (1) it fails to ac-
knowledge important moral and social arguments for a more limited excep-
tion; (2) it does not adequately address concerns that technological changes
render current Fourth Amendment law inadequate; (3) it omits full consid-
eration of other constitutional and legal arguments; (4) its call for federal
legislation frustrates standardization imperatives in the law enforcement
sphere; and (5) its proposed penalty-based approach fails, at least in part, in
the law enforcement context.
A. Moral and SocialArguments for a More Limited Exception
Numerous commentators have offered thoughtful and compelling moral
justifications for establishing privacy rules and laws in general. 2 These
arguments tend to support the assertion that lawmakers should establish a
strong, consistent set of rules governing law enforcement's use of private
medical records. One major moral rationale for establishing privacy rules is
that respect for autonomy is entwined with respect for privacy. As Gostin
states, "To respect the privacy of others is to respect their autonomous
wishes not to be accessed in some respect-not to be observed or have in-
formation about themselves made available to others."2 3 Gostin goes on to
note that respecting privacy promotes "a sense of self and of personhood,"
which in turn allows individuals to "develop the capacity to be self-
governing."214 These are important moral goals that can have utilitarian
benefits as well.
215
212 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 162, at 266-81 (detailing the different sources, such as
the ethical principles of the medical profession and state and federal law, from which physi-
cians can derive privacy rules having to do with disclosure of patient information); Gostin,
supra note 8, at 513-16 (describing several "ethical justifications for informational privacy").
213 Gostin, supra note 8, at 513-14.
214 Id. at514.
215 For instance, one might hope that the self-governing individual will not require law
enforcement surveillance or investigation to the same extent as another individual lacking
such internal control.
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Additionally, the assertion that privacy protection from law enforce-
ment intrusion into medical records promotes the development "of intimate
human relationships-relationships of trust" supports such protection.
2 1 6
Gostin also acknowledges the benefits of this moral imperative, noting that
an "expectation of privacy allows individuals to confide freely in their phy-
sicians."2 17 The law should recognize harm to an individual's moral rights
as a harm in itself without requiring a showing of any consequential practi-
cal harm.2 18 The notion that this moral benefit also has utilitarian social
ramifications-improved confidence in the provider-patient relationship-
should result in improved communication between patient and doctor, and
hence improved care. Indeed, although some scholars have recognized cer-
tain aspects of this benefit,z19 one should analyze the multitude of facets to
this general social benefit with particularity.
First, improving care could benefit not only the individual, but also so-
ciety. As these beneficial individual experiences accumulate at a societal
level, they will reduce the costs of Medicare and other govemment-funded
health care programs which later assume responsibility for financing such
interventions. Also, improved communications between doctor and patient
should improve the accuracy of data that supports public health research,
and hence public health. Finally, more open communication could ostensi-
bly lower the individual's cost of care, as honest, open communication re-
duces the need for expensive diagnostic procedures by narrowing the scope
of the physician's inquiry.
Promulgating a standard of privacy that is markedly unrestrictive for
law enforcement's use of medical records would severely undermine these
moral and resulting social benefits. Such a failure in privacy protection
might undercut any achievements sought by the remainder of the HHS Re-
port. Undoubtedly, the moral demands for privacy are valid, and the socie-
tal benefits which flow from these moral imperatives are substantial. Im-
portantly, lawmakers can only protect these moral and social benefits in the
216 Gostin, supra note 8, at 514.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1147 (3d
Cir. 1995) (Lewis, J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting that the lack of direct harm to an
individual should not figure in the analysis of determining whether an improper intrusion into
that individual's medical records gives rise to liability).
219 Gellman, for example, notes that the "'assurance of confidentiality encourages pa-
tients to be candid with their physicians, and candor is essential to effective diagnosis and
medical management of the patient's ailments."' Gellman, supra note 162, at 257 (quoting
Privacy of Medical Records: Hearings on H.R. 2979 and H.R. 3444 Before the Gov't Info.
and Individual Rights Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1129 (1979) (statement of James H. Sammons, M.D., Executive Vice President, Ameri-
can Medical Association)).
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rapidly changing context of technology and health care delivery if they reas-
sess how best to protect these benefits in light of the larger societal
changes.220 The HHS Report completely fails to acknowledge these moral
and social reasons for review of the law enforcement exception, and there-
fore puts at risk both the moral imperatives and their concomitant social
benefits. This seems especially unsettling, given the government's in-
creased presence as a participant in the health care delivery system, and its
resultant increased role as police officer in the health care arena.
221
B. Realities of Technological Change: The General Needfor Reevaluation
and the Fourth Amendment Problem
As this Comment demonstrates, the technological advances in health
care delivery and health information usage have been so rapid and profound
that many paradigms related to health care have been rendered obsolete. 
2
There is no doubt that this obsolescence is also true of the legal framework
for medical records privacy protection. Indeed, both HIPAA and the HHS
Report are responses to these transformationsYm
Plainly, law enforcement's use of private medical records is subject to
these same realities of change. However, the HHS Report fails to consider
how these changes have altered the balance between law enforcement's ac-
cess to medical histories and individuals' privacy interests-this is a crucial
flaw in its recommendations concerning the law enforcement exception.
Consider for example a scenario suggested by Senator Frist during Secretary
Shalala's recommendations testimony: during a fraud and abuse inspection
of Medicare records, HHS investigators discover information that may indi-
cate criminal activity, and pursue this possible lead.224 The discovered in-
formation is highly confidential and would be damaging to the individual's
220 Judith DeCew briefly mentions this need for reevaluation of legal constructs to protect
moral imperatives in light of technological change, noting that "technological advances with-
out restriction often erase one's ability to maintain privacy and control information about one-
self." DECEW, supra note 114, at 162.
221 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 162, at 260-61 ("With the implementation of Medicare
and Medicaid in 1966, the share of the nation's health bill paid by government increased sig-
nificantly.... These programs, which include ... fraud, abuse, and waste investigations, fre-
quently require access to identifiable patient information to carry out their functions." (foot-
notes omitted)).
222 See discussion supra Part L.A (reviewing the changes in information technology and
medical research, and the concurrent transformation of health care delivery).
2D See discussion supra Parts I.B.1-2 (describing the influence of changes in health in-
formation technology, health care delivery, and medical records usage on the passage of
HIPAA and the HHS Report).
224 See Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 9.
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privacy interests if exposed.225 At this level of description, it seems that the
technology of modem database searching has aided law enforcement in
identifying and pursuing crime, with little practical harm to the privacy
rights of law-abiding citizens.
Yet, further examination reveals a murkier picture. Although sophisti-
cated data mining techniques make collateral collection of information pos-
sible, such technological advances do not provide appropriate decision-
making guidance to law enforcement, and can in fact lead to harmful results.
Suppose further that law enforcement acted on the results of its data mining,
yet found (only after revealing the confidential information and thus harm-
ing the individual's privacy interests) that the information was erroneous,
incomplete, or led police to the wrong conclusion.2 6
It is this fundamental change in how searches are conducted, driven by
technological changes and the computerization of private medical records,
that raises concerns. These changes relate not only to the potentially ex-
panding scope of law enforcement intrusions, but also to the changes in
technology that render current legal limitations in this area ineffective. For
example, the Fourth Amendment case underlying much of law enforce-
ment's ability to search medical records, United States v. Miller, rests on the
notion that there can be no protected Fourth Amendment interest where
there is neither ownership nor possession of the "property" in question.2 7
Such a formulation of this interest clearly would exclude medical informa-
tion stored in modem client-server or database architectures. As a conse-
quence, the mixture of this outmoded legal reasoning and modem develop-
ments in computerization of medical records leads to a sharp and violent
curtailment of the privacy protections that individuals should and rightly do
expect in this area. To leave such results in place, as the HHS recommen-
225 See id.
226 There is precedent for this unfortunate result. In an apt analogy, Dr. Margo Gold-
mans, a Boston psychiatrist, described how marketers performed data mining on medical rec-
ords, and based on the results, assumed that a patient of hers was receiving treatment for im-
potency. The resulting flow of junk mail caused considerable embarrassment for the
individual, and undermined his confidence in the therapist-patient confidentiality. See All
Things Considered: Data Mining Regulations (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 26, 1997).
Note the similarity between this scenario and one where police, allowed to cast an unfet-
tered net over confidential medical records, could draw conclusions and make arrests that not
only were in error, but also led to considerable harm, and undermined patients' confidence in
the doctor-patient relationship. The HHS Report specifically addresses the scenario Dr.
Goldmans describes, yet fails to consider the plausible law enforcement analogy, allowing it
to remain a distinct possibility.
227 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect indi-
viduals' interests in records maintained by banks pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act, because
the individuals could assert "neither ownership nor possession" over the banks' business rec-
ords).
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dation on the law enforcement exception does, seems incongruous with the
balance of the Report's appreciation for the legal impact of technological
change, and counter to citizens' expectations of privacy in a modem, tech-
nological society.
C. Other Constitutional and Legal Arguments for a
More Limited Exception
Changes in technology and health information management should
drive a critical reevaluation of laws that potentially govern law enforce-
ment's usage of private health records. The privacy cases, both those at the
Supreme Court level seeking to identify a constitutional right to privacy,
228
and the tort- and contract-based cases at the state level,229 often employ a
balancing of interests framework. This allows for a certain flexibility in ju-
dicial decision making, and would thus seem to provide some adaptability
for this legal approach as technology transforms health care and the usage of
private health information. Indeed, the first major privacy case at the Su-
preme Court level to focus on governmental intrusion into individuals'
health records privacy, Whalen v. Roe, 23 identified this very issue. Al-
though in his concurrence Justice Brennan agreed with the results of the
balancing test upholding New York State's right to collect confidential pre-
scription records for addictive drugs, he was concerned about the changing
nature of technology and its effect on the government's ability to intrude
into personal medical records. "The central storage and easy accessibility of
computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information
contained in the data, such as [confidential medical information], and I am
not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the neces-
sity of some curb on such technology."2'
3
There is no doubt that later cases exhibit great deference to asserted
governmental interests. Unfortunately, the courts in these cases have not
heeded Brennan's warning that technological advances should drive a re-
evaluation of the relative weights of these interests,232 despite the potential
228 See supra Part ll.A.I (reviewing the line of Supreme Court cases developing a non-
Fourth Amendment, constitutionally-based right to privacy).
229 See supra Part lI.D.1 (briefly reviewing common law causes of action available to an
individual seeking to redress improper access or use of the individual's private medical rec-ords).
30 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (holding that a statute authorizing a state to record the
name, address, and age of patients who receive prescriptions for certain dangerous, legitimate
drugs did not violate any constitutional rights to privacy).
231 Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
232 See supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing cases following Whalen that demonstrate increased
deference to government intrusions into medical records pfivacy).
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harm such changes in health information management and usage can
cause.233  Courts readily embrace governmental justifications for privacy
intrusions, while they receive arguments decrying the more troubling as-
pects of the new computerization and use of private health data less warmly.
Assuming that this imbalance will only be further exacerbated as technology
and the use of health records advance, the HHS Report should have at least
acknowledged this as a potential problem in the area of law enforcement's
use of medical information, and as a justification for a more serious review
of current law enforcement uses of private medical data. Moreover, legal
commentators have put forth convincing arguments that should shift courts'
current weighing of the opposing interests,2 34 and the HIPAA mandate of-
fered an excellent opportunity to at least consider these arguments. Never-
theless, HHS let this opportunity slip away, failing to raise this important
issue in its recommendations for legislation.
Instead, HHS recommended that the current state of this balancing ap-
proach be retained in the law enforcement context, despite its inherent un-
certain and unfavorable attitude toward privacy. Removing this uncertainty
would strengthen patient confidence in communication with their health
care providers, and this would help further social benefits already described.
On the other hand, uncertainty chills communication and lessens the effi-
cacy of health care delivery. Moreover, the importance of this constitu-
tional right demands that it be accorded a certain level of clarity; the intan-
gible, moral benefits of the right are made real by clear rules describing law
enforcement's ability to obtain and use private health records.
233 See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the medical records disclosure
at issue in the Doe case).
234 Many have argued that since the government is the primary collector and user of pri-
vate information, individuals should not have to rely on that same government's discretion in
protecting their privacy rights. Instead, commentators believe that an effective constitutional
shield is required to prevent improper government (and thus law enforcement) intrusion into
private information. See, e.g., Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of
Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 133-35 (1991) (describing the conflict between
the "government as 'collector' and ... as 'protector,"' and arguing for a constitutional right to
informational privacy).
Furthermore, another scholar has suggested that when performing the balancing typical in
law enforcement privacy intrusion cases, courts fail to consider the significant value to the
general public of the individual's privacy protection. In this sense, the balancing does not
consider the governmental interest in preserving privacy when constructing its own policies
and procedures. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 147 (1991)
(noting that government "[o]fficias who take seriously the [privacy] rights enunciated by the
courts... [should] take into account the citizen's interests in privacy when constructing gov-
ernment operating procedures").
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D. The Need for Federal-Level Law in the Law Enforcement Context
Although the HHS Report recommends that Congress enact federal
legislation, adoption of the HHS position on the law enforcement exception
would do no more than codify the current morass of incomplete and often
conflicting rules covering this aspect of medical information privacy.
2 35
HHS recommends federal legislation primarily to rectify the inconsistencies
concerning other facets of health information privacy,2 36 but ironically,
codification of this unwieldy body of law would only entrench the ambigu-
ity currently characterizing law enforcement's use of medical records. As
with other areas of the HHS proposal, federal legislation should standardize
the law enforcement exception, not ossify confusion and incompleteness.
More general arguments for federal-level standardization of health informa-
tion privacy echo this concern and also support the implementation of clear
federal standards governing law enforcement usage of such information.
237
Moreover, the few examples of state-level standardization of the law
enforcement exemption have met with generally favorable opinions.
23 8
Federal level uniformity would not result in absolute privacy rights, but in-
stead would allow patients, physicians, and law enforcement officers to
make correct decisions more easily by knowing in advance what rules guide
their actions. In contrast, these parties are often ignorant of, or torn by, po-
tentially competing claims and interests. For example, doctors commonly
face contradictory interests and imperatives, such as a patient's confidenti-
ality and a third party's safety from harm by that patient. 23  Undoubtedly
235 Recall that the HHS Report proposes merely to recognize existing state laws regarding
standards of law enforcement access to confidential medical information. See HHS REPORT,
supra note 18, pt. II.D.10 (acknowledging that the proposed rules for law enforcement are "an
exception to the basic principle of the protections" espoused by the HHS Report, and asserting
that any legislation should merely "maintain current practices" of the existing patchwork of
laws).
See id. pt I.B (recognizing and approving a need for federal legislation generally).
237 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 8, at 516-17 (reviewing the general arguments for federal
preemption in the medical records privacy area).
A related and significant practical reason for standardization in this context is that often
the large number of authorized health information users are too confused by the variations
among the conflicting legal standards to attempt to comply with them when faced with a de-
mand for information from law enforcement. Many users assume that law enforcement
authorities are certain of their rights regarding access to confidential medical information and
therefore rarely challenge such requests. Interview with Mark Davidson, supra note 34.
238 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 162, at 278-79 (assessing Rhode Island's clearly de-
fined exceptions to medical record confidentiality, including its treatment of the law enforce-
ment exception).
239 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-46 (1976)
(finding that third parties have an actionable interest in disclosure by physicians to prevent
harm by physicians' patients).
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this is a close question that cannot be reduced to a precise legislative rule,
but certainly a federal law in this area could clarify the relevant issues for
physicians, thereby increasing the likelihood of correct decisions and out-
comes.
E. Concerns Over the Proposed Legislation s Penalty-BasedApproach in
the Law Enforcement Sphere
The HHS Report makes clear that it recommends no substantive
changes to current law governing police usage of medical records, but it
does suggest a somewhat novel approach to administering the current re-
strictions on law enforcement. Instead of reforming this area of the law, the
HHS Report recommends that law enforcement personnel be subject to the
penalties proposed in the Report.240 Secretary Shalala explains this ap-
proach as such: "What we are not doing is changing current access laws by
law enforcement. What we are doing is adding very severe penalties if they
misuse that access." 241 Such an approach, however, begs the question of
whether the "current access laws" are clear enough such that "severe penal-
ties" can be meted out in a judicially consistent and effective manner. If the
laws are too weak, too conflicted, and too incomplete, then how will judges
decide when to impose penalties for their transgression? This is a looming
question in light of the current state of access laws and the penalties-based
solution in the proposed legislation. If the laws are not clear, then the pen-
alties lose their efficacy and are unlikely to deter improper law enforcement
conduct.
More importantly, privacy interests in medical records are protected
only by preventing disclosure, not by punishing it. Rather, a clearly defined
and strictly tailored set of law enforcement exceptions would go much fur-
ther toward promoting the moral, social, and constitutional imperatives em-
bodied in privacy interests than would a set of penalties for transgressions of
poorly defined guidelines. A penalties-based approach seems especially in-
appropriate in light of the confused and lax current state of the law in this
area.
240 See HHS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. II.D.10 (asserting that "[w]e are not recom-
mending any changes to existing legal constraints that govern access to or use of patient in-
formation by law enforcement agencies" and that "our recommendations would make obtain-
ing health information under false pretenses be a Federal felony").
241 Hearings Statement, supra note 81, at 14.
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IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCEPTION:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the criticisms of the proposed HHS recommendations for federal
legislation, some proposals for possible improvement are warranted. The
suggestions that follow are grouped into four general categories: (1) enact-
ing a standardized federal law governing law enforcement's access to medi-
cal records; (2) establishing more stringent standards within the interest-
balancing context and altering the state of Fourth Amendment law in this
area; (3) broadening and strengthening physician-patient confidentiality;
and (4) accommodating technological changes in medical information man-
agement and usage. The following recommendations hopefully would pro-
vide some insight into how changes in information management and use in
the medical arena intersect with potential legal paradigms governing law en-
forcement's use of this information. More importantly, however, these sug-
gestions are meant to embrace the benefits of technology for both medicine
and law enforcement, as well as to introduce solutions that accommodate
the important privacy interests implicated by the new, technologically-
driven world.
A. Enact a Standardized Federal Law
At this point, the need for, and benefits of, standardized federal rules
governing law enforcement use of private medical information should be
clear.242 Indeed, the advocacy of a federal law governing medical records
privacy in general is not novel.243 There is, however, an additional argu-
ment for enacting specific federal laws governing this area of privacy. This
argument is especially timely given the structure and nature of both HIPAA
and the HHS Report. At present, should Congress fail to act by August
1999, HIPAA mandates that HHS must write federal regulations to take ef-
fect no later than six months after that time.244 Although this provision
guarantees that some regulations will be in place by the end of 1999, such
an approach would not offer the strongest and clearest set of law enforce-
ment access rules or the best possible set of medical records privacy laws.
242 See supra Part II.D (describing arguments in support of a standard federal law to
clarify law enforcement's ability to access and use confidential medical records).
See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 8, at 516-17 (stating that this area of privacy law would
benefit from a preemptive federal statute governing the use of confidential medical informa-
tion).
244 See HIPAA § 264, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (setting forth the timetable for leg-
islation and/or regulations).
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By failing to take advantage of the opportunity to assess seriously and
propose thoughtful, clear law enforcement rules, HHS has demonstrated that
it lacks either the desire, the conviction, or the political will to propose op-
timal revisions to this area of the law. Further, the statutory foundation of
this set of HHS regulations would be HIPAA. This grounding is weak for a
number of reasons. First, the goals of HIPAA's Title II center around a de-
sire to speed computerization of health records and to prevent fraud and
abuse. The protection of privacy is not the central intent of either HIPAA in
general or Title II.245 Second, as a result of HIPAA's focus on technologi-
cal and administrative simplification, HIPAA fails to list explicitly law en-
forcement as an institution to which its privacy standards will apply.246 The
Act simply is not drafted to consider these organizations in such a direct
manner. Third, HIPAA does not explicitly discuss the law enforcement use
of private medical records as one of the transactions covered by the law.
247
Given the legal principle that judicial inquiries can often center around
congressional intent in passing legislation 248 it seems that HIPAA's pedi-
gree would offer little support for a robust interpretation of any privacy
regulations HHS might promulgate.249 Especially in the contentious and
conflicted area of law enforcement access to medical information, it seems
that a dubious legislative foundation might undermine the efficacy of any
regulations subjected to judicial scrutiny. Statutory law which fails even to
define "confidentiality 2 50 is certain to fall short of HHS's objective.
245 See id. § 261, 110 Stat. at 2021 (stating that the purpose of the Act is to improve "the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system [by establishing] standards and require-
ments for the electronic transmission of certain health information"); see also supra notes 59-
63 and accompanying text (detailing the purpose of HIPAA and noting that privacy protection
is omitted from the Act's central purview).
246 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-l(a) (Supp. H 1996) (stating that standards shall apply to "a
health plan," "a health care clearinghouse," and "a healthcare provider who transmits any
health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction" covered by the law).
247 See id. § 1320d-2(a)(2) (listing the transactions to which the standards apply, but
omitting law enforcement use).
248 Language from Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 901 F.2d 147
(D.C. Cir. 1990), offers some insight into the Court's approach to this issue: "In determining
the intent of Congress, we must look to 'the particular statutory language at issue, as well as
the language and design of the statute as a whole,' and we must employ traditional tools of
statutory construction, including, where appropriate, legislative history." Id at 154 (citation
omitted).
249 Given the guidance in Public Citizen, HIPAA's stated intention to "simplify the ad-
ministration of health insurance" would seem to provide only weak support for a protective
interretation of congressional intent. HIPAA, 110 Stat. at 1936.
2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (omitting a definition of "confidentiality" and ne-
glecting to provide guidance on who may have access to medical records).
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B. Establish a "Compelling State Interest" Standard and Strict
Warrant Requirements Via Clear and Precise Law
Enforcement Exceptions
Although the law is unclear in this area, it appears that Congress cannot
simply legislate an explicit Constitution-level interest in privacy. Rather,
Congress may only respond to the courts' recognition of a constitutional
right or push for a constitutional amendment.251 Congress, however, can
enact legislation that guides judges to give more weight to citizens' privacy
interests relative to the law enforcement's need for access, or that altogether
alters the framework of the analysis in the judicial context. Specifically,
Congress should pass legislation that underscores the importance of the pri-
vacy right. It can do so by first establishing a presumptive rule that prohib-
its all disclosure of certain medical information without prior, meaningful
patient consent. Given the practical realities of the need for unauthorized
disclosure in certain instances, the law should also clearly and precisely de-
scribe a finite list of exceptions.252 No exception, however, should carry
with it a presumptive waiver of the subpoena or warrant requirement. The
conditions which merit dispensing with these requirements have been ad-
dressed adequately by a portion of Fourth Amendment law.253 Additionally,
obtaining a court order should be dependent upon law enforcement officials'
ability to demonstrate that the information sought furthers compelling, le-
gitimate goals that clearly outweigh the privacy interests of the individ-
ual.
254
251 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (stating that Congress "has
been given the power 'to enforce' [the Constitution], not the power to determine what consti-
tutes a constitutional violation").
252 There is ample precedent for this approach. See, e.g., Federal Privacy of Medical In-
formation Act, H.R. 5935, 96th Cong. § 131 (1980) (proposing a framework that would have
required law enforcement agencies to certify in writing that the information sought was for
one of five purposes specifically permitted under the bill). This approach is also similar to
that seen in the Rhode Island law discussed supra note 207.
253 Note that such a formulation would not prevent law enforcement from obtaining ac-
cess without clearing these legal hurdles in every instance. This, in fact, is the legal principle
that supports the exigent circumstances rule. See I HALL, supra note 143, § 14.1, at 582-83
("'Exigent circumstances' is actually not an exception to the warrant requirement. It is but a
condition which permits dispensing with the requirement of a warrant for a search as long as
the condition exists.").
254 An example of this type of strict approach is contained in Senator Leahy's proposed
1997 bill governing medical record confidentiality. See S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 215(a)-(b)
(1997) (imposing a uniform requirement that law enforcement obtain a court order before ac-
cessing medical records and necessitating a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
records are "necessary" for the investigation of a "particular violation of criminal law," and
that the need for the confidential information outweighs the individual's privacy interests).
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Such an approach stands in stark contrast to the mix of legal approaches
currently in place, in both the fundamental structure of the principle and the
extent to which the principle is expressed here. In the penumbral constitu-
tional privacy right line of cases, which balance privacy rights against the
government's need for access, this approach could readjust the balance that
has developed to give, in many contexts, too much deference to government
justifications for access. In the Fourth Amendment area, this approach im-
plicitly embraces the Katz approach, while rejecting the flawed Miller ar-
guments. s s
Since Whalen first established and applied a constitutional right to pri-
vacy in medical records, the courts have shifted undeniably toward a ready
acceptance of almost any stated government interest, including those con-
cerned with law enforcement functions. 6 This imbalance persists despite
the fact that significant changes in technology and medical records use have
drastically improved the government's ability to collect and analyze confi-
dential data in ways not imagined by the Whalen court.25 7  Indeed, the
courts' ready acceptance of governmental reasoning for this intrusion has
led Professor Gostin to conclude that "[a]bsent an improbable upward shift
in the courts' level of scrutiny, issues of health informational privacy will be
settled in the legislative and executive branches of government." 258 By nar-
rowly defining a finite number of exceptions for law enforcement's access
to medical records (and establishing a stricter presumptive warrant require-
ment), Congress would underscore the importance of the individual's pri-
vacy right and help to place into context the nature of government's asser-
tion of its interests.259  Thus, this strictly limiting structure should help
255 See supra notes 150-70 and accompanying text (approving of the Katz Court's ac-
knowledgment of a reasonable expectation of privacy and criticizing the Miller Court's own-
ership-based approach).
256 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the judicial shift toward increased deference to the
governmental interest).
257 See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of unfettered
data mining in the law enforcement context).
258 Gostin, supra note 8, at 498.
259 A complementary approach also warrants merit. In addition to listing specific excep-
tions to the general protections, a bill might also identify certain prohibitions in order to spe-
cifically eliminate the potential commission of these acts. For example, Senator Leahy's 1997
proposal prohibited the use of health-related evidence of criminal activity that is collected by
law enforcement during the course of an investigation not related to that criminal activity. See
S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 215(e) (1997) (barring use of any "[p]rotected health information"
found in the course of an investigation for purposes other than "action[s] or investigation[s]
aris[ing] out of... the law enforcement inquiry for which the information was obtained").
Such a specific prohibition could minimize the chance that the data mining hypothetical dis-
cussed supra in notes 225-26 and accompanying text might occur.
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courts to understand the need for law enforcement to assert a compelling,
rather than merely rational, interest.
Similarly, this approach fundamentally alters the current Miller analysis
commonly employed in Fourth Amendment claims of medical records pri-
vacy. Currently, courts relying on Miller often make assumptions that
lessen the expectation of privacy in one's medical records or reject a privacy
claim on the grounds that computerized health information is not the prop-
erty of the individual asserting the right.260 As has been noted, this logic
flies in the face of prior legal reasoning established in Katz,261 and contra-
dicts the realities of modem health information management. 262 In contrast,
the general statutory framework suggested by this Comment embraces the
reasoning and structure of the Katz analysis, which seems highly appropri-
ate in the medical records-law enforcement context. At its heart, Katz offers
a two-step inquiry: (1) has the individual exhibited "an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy" in the information at issue, and (2) if yes, is that ex-
pectation "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 263 The
proposed legislative approach recognizes that courts often answer the first
question affirmatively in this context, and the narrowly defined exceptions
to the general privacy rule would offer substantial guidance in answering
the second inquiry. Thus, constructing a statute in this manner would
minimize the outmoded and harmful impact of the Miller decision in the
medical records arena.
It is important to understand that this approach need not hamper law en-
forcement's efficacy in obtaining information and fulfilling its essential so-
cietal role. Most commonly, law enforcement advocates cite the need to re-
spond immediately to imminent potential harms or to identify wrongdoing
before it is hidden. As a consequence, law enforcement argues that obtain-
ing a warrant or other judicial approval for access hampers its ability to per-
form its job.264 Despite these protests, ample precedent exists for such legal
protections of confidential information.
265
260 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-42 (1976) (requiring an examination of
"the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning their contents" and rejecting an indi-
vidual's claim where the individual to whom the records apply "can assert neither ownership
nor possession").
61 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967) (eschewing the property-
based approach to Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure).
262 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting the considerable criticism Miller
has received).
263 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
264 See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Just Between You, Your Doctor, and the Police, THE WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 1997, at A21 (noting that police organizations often object to warrant re-
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Moreover, the changes in technology that have given rise to the need
for these new privacy protections can also help speed law enforcement's
surveillance and investigatory efforts. Inevitable changes in health infor-
mation management will simplify law enforcement's efforts in this area,
further reducing the need for broad access. For example, many observers
recognize that the federal government, working in concert with private in-
surers and providers, will assign patients a universal identifier for health re-
266cords in the near future, even within the next two years. Such a change
would effectively increase the speed and scope of law enforcement's reach
into personal health data, furthering the trolling of data for illicit activity,
and offering the temptation to seek information via citizens' health records.
Judicial review of the purpose and intentions of such an investigation seems
an appropriate counterbalance to these improved capabilities.
2 67
Finally, although the precision and limited nature of the exceptions has
been stressed, one should remember that such exceptions can and will pro-
vide law enforcement with the essential capabilities that current statutorily-
mandated reporting offers. For example, many current state laws require
quirements in this context because "[t]o secure physical evidence ... there isn't time to get a
judicial warrant or deal with rules protecting medical records").
265 Law enforcement officials cannot access cable television subscriptions and informa-
tion without obtaining a court order concluding that the information sought is material to the
current investigation, and that this conclusion is based on clear and convincing evidence. See
47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (1994) (allowing any "government entity" to "obtain personally identifi-
able information concerning a cable subscriber ... only if' it meets a "clear and convincing"
standard in a court proceeding). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 2518, as noted in United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), embodies a congressional intent to ensure that law enforce-
ment interception of private wire and oral communications occur only with restraint and only
where circumstances warrant such intrusion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994); Giordano, 416
U.S. at 515 ("Congress legislated [§ 2518] in considerable detail ... to make doubly sure that
the statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant ... ").
Section 2518 sets strict requirements regarding the substance of the application to the court,
including a complete statement on the other investigative procedures attempted prior to the
application. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(c). Section 2518 also authorizes judicial approval of
such a warrant application only when a judge finds probable cause exists under a set of strict
requirements and when it appears unlikely that other investigative procedures would succeed.
See id. § 2518(3) (setting out four specific findings required to support the issuance of a war-
rant).
266 See Allen, supra note 9, at 13 ("The Clinton administration's aim is to help create a
seamless nationwide records system that eventually may involve a 'universal patient identi-
fier,' the equivalent of a Social Security number for each patient."). But see supra note 9 (dis-
cussing recent impediments to this plan).
26 Technology could help law enforcement in more mundane ways that would help rec-
oncile these new privacy protections with law enforcement's ability to perform its job. For
example, in response to the argument that crime-fighting imperatives often obviate the luxury
of constitutional protocol, Nat Hentoff quipped, "[W]hy can't current swift technology be
used to find a magistrate quickly and get the warrant in time? Magistrates have home phone
numbers, and even fax machines." Hentoff, supra note 264, at A21.
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physicians to report certain injuries, such as gunshot wounds, the contrac-
tion of highly contagious diseases, and injuries associated with child
268abuse. Although the logic supporting many of these exceptions needs re-
view, this review should not create an expectation that the required report-
ing should be eliminated wholesale within the proposed framework.
C. Broaden and Strengthen the Principle ofPhysician-Patient
Confidentiality
Proposed legislation should also expand and invigorate the doctor-
patient confidentiality privilege by shifting and possibly expanding current
notions of liability in medical records privacy cases involving law enforce-
ment access to such information. Note how establishing liability for those
who wrongfully disclose personal health information complements the pre-
sumption against disclosure to law enforcement without patient consent.
Thus, this suggestion works in tandem with the proposed structure of the
law governing law enforcement access by providing another impediment to
improper disclosure, from the vantage point of the potential discloser. Such
a prohibition would be in addition to the penalties suggested for wrongful
law enforcement users of confidential data, as the HHS Report proposes.269
Despite the Hippocratic Oath270 and present-day manifestations of the
physician's duty to keep patient information private,271 doctors often have
the discretion to offer law enforcement personnel confidential informa-
tion.272 Typically, doctors confronting these scenarios have little guidance
268 See Gellman, supra note 162, at 274 & n.78 (listing some of-the physician reporting
requirements that states have enacted, mandating communication between doctors and law
enforcement agencies).
269 For a general discussion of this penalties-based approach, see supra notes 241-42 and
accompanying text.
1 HIPPocRATEs 164-65 (W. Jones trans., Loeb Classical Library Series 1923), re-
printed in ETMICS IN MEDICINE 5 (Stephen Reiser et al. eds., 1977) ("[W]hatsoever I shall see
or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse
with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such
thins to be holy secrets.").
71 The most recent set of AMA ethics can be found in AMERiCAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETMICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
(1980), reprinted in CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ix (1981) ("A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of col-
leagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the
constraints of the law.").
272 See Gellman, supra note 162, at 280-84. Professor Gellman discusses the law en-
forcement hypothetical within a section of his article entitled "Discretionary Disclosures," and
notes that when considering the disclosure decision, doctors often find that, "[t]he slippery
slope in this area is particularly steep. Once cooperation begins, it is hard to find a place to
stop." Id. at 286.
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in the form of statutes or rules. 273 As has been noted, establishing a clear
prohibition on disclosure, like standardization of law enforcement access in
general, makes the decision simpler for physicians. This increases the like-
lihood of compliance, and therefore strengthens privacy protection. Moreo-
ver, broadening liability beyond the strict doctor-patient relationship reflects
the realities of modem health care delivery and health information manage-
ment-literally scores of physicians, therapists, nurses, and administrative
personnel routinely use or have access to confidential health data. These
people also need motivation to defend the privacy interests of patients. This
is especially important since law enforcement officials most commonly ob-
tain access to such information through authorized users of the informa-
274tion. Thus, the interaction serves as a logical focal point for the estab-
lishment of barriers to improper disclosure.
Admittedly, law enforcement will obtain necessary information from
health care providers via exceptions to the presumptive privacy rule.
Moreover, exceptions to this confidentiality rule seem warranted in that
physicians and therapists should have clear guidance on when their duty
shifts from confidentiality to reporting or disclosure, such as to prevent im-
minent harm. 27 Narrow exceptions .in instances such as these should offer
an acceptable balance between the protection of privacy and the interests of
law enforcement.
D. Accommodate TechnologicalAdvances in the New
Law Enforcement Exception
This general notion is implicit in a number of the recommendations dis-
cussed above, but its central importance therein merits a separate discussion
of its ramifications. Technology has served as the driver of change in medi-
cal records management. It was the impetus behind the passage of HIPAA,
273
Regardless of the decision of a physician on any particular disclosure request-
whether the requester is the Secret Service, a fraud investigator, a medical
researcher, an intelligence agency, or someone else-the physician generally faces
the decision without any meaningful guidance. Basic principles of medical ethics
are silent on these issues, and the law is filled with uncertainties about the potential
liabilities of physicians who must decide whether to disclose patient information.
Id. at 286-87.
274 See supra note 237 (discussing the typical acquiescence by authorized users when
responding to law enforcement requests for confidential information).
275 See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)).
1999] LAWENFORCEMENTACCESS TO MEDICAL RECORDS
intended to facilitate further computerization of health records.276 The ef-
fects of technological change lie at the center of the principles guiding the
HHS Report on health records confidentiality. Going forward, cognizance
of the evolving character of technology in this area should help define the
contours of any new privacy law.
In particular, technological change dictates that flexible approaches will
work best when constructing rules in this area. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that the HHS Report suggests that regulatory and rulemaking authority
be established so that developments in technology can be matched by rapid
and nuanced changes in the applicable rules.2 77 For similar reasons, many
commentators have called for the establishment of expert commissions to
analyze changes in health information management and use, and to periodi-
cally recommend changes to laws and rules.
278
Arguing for such a commission or group is not novel. However, within
this initiative, special attention should be paid to how technological devel-
opments impact law enforcement's ability to access private medical infor-
mation, and rule modifications should be suggested accordingly. For exam-
ple, both the implementation of universal health identifiers2 79 and the
creation of technology to promote the segregation and security of informa-
tion within a patient's total medical record2 80 could impact how law en-
forcement should be allowed to access this information, and which items
within the record it should see. Particular emphasis on this specific area of
responsibility for an oversight committee or federal agency charged with
rulemaking accomplishes two goals: (1) it creates a mechanism for early
understanding of how future technological changes in health information
might drive needed changes in the laws governing police access to this in-
formation toward preserving individuals' privacy interests in this area, and
(2) it further underscores the importance of citizens' privacy interests vis-A-
276 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (noting that the purposes of HIPAA
focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery).
277 See HHS REPORT, supra note 18, at pt. 1.1.1 ("We recommend that there be authority
to ... develop information and technical guidance for protection of health information; and
develop technology to implement standards regarding health information.").
27 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 340-42 ("The protection of informational self-
determination in an age of rapid technological change mandates the creation of a governmen-
tal body with the institutional expertise and continuity of interest to understand the impact of
chanms in this area and draw attention to the need for improvements in legal regulation.").
9See supra note 266 and accompanying text (acknowledging the goal of creating
unique patient identifiers).
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 178, at 97-98 (1993) (noting
that "access control software" can determine not only "who can use the system," but also
"what system resources they can access").
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vis law enforcement access to confidential medical records in any judicial
balancing.
Interestingly, law enforcement officials have taken the converse posi-
tion, insisting that because of the rapid technological change that character-
izes health information management and record keeping, no new restrictions
should be placed on law enforcement access at this time.281 Such an argu-
ment presupposes that the pace and nature of this change will slow and sta-
bilize at some point in the future, which seems to be an ill-conceived notion
at best. The changes of the past decade have weakened privacy protections,
and it is clear that this process will continue if not addressed. The estab-
lishment of stronger rules, in addition to an oversight body for studying fu-
ture changes and suggesting new solutions to incipient problems, is clearly
preferable to simply waiting for a time that may well never arrive.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion to be drawn from this Comment is a simple one: So-
cietal, technological, legal, and moral justifications exist for Congress to en-
act clear, robust legislation governing law enforcement's use of individually
identifiable medical information. Changes in the delivery of health care,
combined with changes in the collection, use, and sharing of health infor-
mation, drive the need for changes in how law enforcement obtains access
to and uses citizens' health records. Effective law enforcement is essential
to a well-ordered and beneficial society, and this role requires law enforce-
ment's use of medical information. At the same time, moral and legal prin-
ciples demand meaningful privacy protection of health information, not just
for the benefit of society, but for each individual's betterment as well.
The Department of Health and Human Services report to Congress,
"Confidentiality of Individually-Identifiable Health Information," fails to
recognize that these two competing issues must be considered jointly when
Congress debates privacy legislation for medical records. Although the
HHS Report acknowledges that changes in health care and technology drive
the need for change in many areas of medical records privacy law, and that
law enforcement must be able to perform its role as investigator and prose-
cutor, the Report does not adequately address the conflicts between these
two aims. Instead, the Report's recommendations on this subject indicate
an abdication by HHS of its duty to weigh these conflicting aims and create
281 See HIIS REPORT, supra note 18, pt. II.D.10 (stating that the imposition of additional
restrictions on law enforcement's access to medical information databases would be inappro-
priate "[u]ntil more experience is gained with the nature and speed of computerization of these
records").
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potential reconciliations between them. Indeed, rather than getting the bal-
ancing wrong, it seems that HHS simply returned this controversial subject
to Congress, wherein ultimate responsibility for the form and content of fu-
ture law in this area lies.
The critique of the law enforcement exception contained in the HHS
Report, then, is also implicitly a critique of the failings of current law in this
field. The arguments that compose this critique, and resulting recommen-
dations for fixing the HHS recommendations, are therefore founded upon
the perceived weaknesses of the present legal framework. As Congress re-
turns to medical records privacy in the coming months, it must consider
many of the issues at stake in the law enforcement use of health informa-
tion; for the concerns, interests, and rights in this seemingly narrow sub-
section of the debate over medical records privacy, in fact, loom largely
over the ultimate strength of protection that any new law will provide.
Without a narrowly and more clearly defined law enforcement exception,
the government's ability to reach far into our private medical records will
become more than just a chilling movie screen fantasy.
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